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Abstract: 
The Great Recession of 2007 and 2008 exposed the risks of excessive borrowing. We learned the 
essential economic principle that greater leverage harbors greater risk. Although this global economic 
contraction was driven primarily by booming private credit expansion, economically inefficient incentives 
in the public sector, such as short-term reelection concerns, may lead politicians to engage in rash deficit- 
financed, fiscal spending. The primary purpose of this research is to assess the economic costs of 
heightened, preexisting government leverage on real economic outcomes during recessionary periods, 
focusing on both banking and non-banking crisis recessions. In both advanced economies and emerging 
economies, this study confirms that banking recessions are associated with more severe economic 
contractions and more persistent output declines than normal recessions. In advanced economies, GDP 
recovers quickly and strongly with expansionary and supportive fiscal policy during low debt recessions, 
even with depressed private investment. While GDP recovers slowly and weakly with less expansionary 
fiscal policy during high debt recessions, even with strong private investment. Thus, the social marginal 
benefit of public sector investment exceeds the social marginal benefit of private sector investment in 
advanced economies. In emerging economies, GDP recovers quickly and strongly with strong private 
investment during high debt recessions, even with weak fiscal spending. While GDP recovers slowly and 
weakly with depressed private investment during low debt recessions, even with expansionary and 
supportive fiscal policy. Thus, the social marginal benefit of private sector investment exceeds the social 
marginal benefit of public sector investment in emerging economies. 
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Economic Costs of Elevated Public Debt Levels During Banking-Crisis Recessions 
Section 1:  Introduction 
The Great Recession of 2007 and 2008 exposed the risks of excessive borrowing. We learned the 
essential economic principle that greater leverage harbors greater risk. Although this global economic 
contraction was driven primarily by booming private credit expansion, economically inefficient incentives 
in the public sector, such as short-term reelection concerns, may lead politicians to engage in rash deficit-
financed, fiscal spending. Moreover, an expanding national deficit might lower national savings and income 
while crowding out private investment. Furthermore, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and existing 
economic literature, warns that rising government debt can also constrain a government’s ability to respond 
to a crisis or recession.1 Hence, governments must carefully manage public leverage intensity so as to 
support economic growth while balancing the attendant risks. 
The primary purpose of this research is to assess the economic costs of heightened, preexisting 
government leverage on real economic outcomes during recessionary periods, focusing on both banking 
and non-banking crisis recessions. I examine the effect of public debt on the business cycles of advanced 
and emerging economies. Jordà et al. (2013) suggest that deeper recessions follow expansionary periods 
with elevated private credit levels compared to periods with lower private credit levels (please see Section 
2: Literature Review). By contrast, this thesis addresses a previously unexamined facet of debt financing 
through an empirical analysis of the effect of public debt on recessionary periods. The primary research 
question considers how the intensity of government leverage systematically relates to the characteristics of 
a subsequent recession. Recessions are classified using the Bry & Boschan (1971) algorithm, the closest 
algorithmic interpretation of the National Bureau of Economic Research’s (NBER) definition of a 
recession. I use data from 17 advanced economies from 1870-2017 and 68 emerging economies from 1970-
2017 to estimate how the level of government debt accumulation impacts real economic variables (GDP 
per capita, investment per capita, and government expenditures) during two types of recessionary periods: 
normal recessions and banking-crisis recessions. As background, I define a “banking-crisis recession” as 
the occurrence of a banking crisis during the year of, within two years before, or within two years after a 
business cycle peak.2 In other words, a recession becomes a “banking-crisis recession” if a banking crisis 
erupts within a four-year window around the recession peak. I code all other recessions as “normal 
 
1 Romer, Christina D., and David H. Romer. “Fiscal Space and the Aftermath of Financial Crises: How It Matters and Why.” 
National Bureau of Economic Research, April 22, 2019. 
2 A banking-crisis is defined as an event during which a country’s banking sector experiences bank runs, sharp increases in default 
rates accompanied by large losses of capital that result in public intervention, bankruptcy, or the forced merger of major financial 
institutions. This definition squares with that used by Laeven and Valencia (2018), which produces the most widely adopted 
chronology of banking crises. 
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recessions,” including instances when a banking crisis occurred later in the course of a recession. For 
brevity, I refer to these two cases in the remainder of the paper as “banking” and “normal,” respectively. 
Economic theory suggests that banking recessions experience deeper and more persistent economic 
contractions compared to other types of recessions. Employing the standard, closed-economy IS-LM model, 
the IS curve shifts leftward in a non-bank recession. Using the same standard, closed-economy IS-LM 
model, both the IS and LM curves shift leftward in a banking recession. With elevated levels of preexisting 
public leverage, deficit-financed fiscal stimulus cannot be implemented. Thus, these curve shifts remain 
permanent. Therefore, the economy remains trapped at the new equilibrium with the leftward shifted IS 
curve in normal recessions. In banking recessions, the economy remains at the new equilibrium with the 
leftward shifted IS curve and the leftward shifted LM curve. Thus, I hypothesize that real macroeconomic 
outcomes are more severely depressed in banking recessions compared to normal recessions. This is the 
“across recession” hypothesis. 
This model also suggests that real macroeconomic outcomes decline more severely during 
recessions (both types) associated with high preexisting public debt levels than during recessions (both 
types) associated low preexisting public debt levels. At low preexisting debt levels, the IS curve shifts 
leftward in normal recessions. Deficit-financed government stimulus can combat this decline and return 
output to pre-recessions levels. However, a government may be restricted – in part or in whole – from 
borrowing to stimulate the economy if it has excessively elevated levels of debt at the onset of a recession. 
Hence, this pathway facilitating the return of economic output to pre-recession levels may be blocked due 
to high levels of public debt. Analogously, both the IS and LM curves shift leftward in low debt banking 
recessions. Deficit-financed government stimulus can combat both these shifts and return output to pre-
recessions levels. Again, a government may be restricted from borrowing to stimulate the economy if it has 
excessively elevated levels of debt at the onset of a recession. Hence, this pathway facilitating the return of 
economic output to pre-recession levels is blocked due to high levels of public debt. Thus, I hypothesize 
that real macroeconomic outcomes are more severely depressed in high debt recessions compared to low 
debt recessions. This is the “within recession” hypothesis. 
This study has the secondary purpose of determining whether the intensity of government 
borrowing affects the likelihood of a banking crisis, ceteris paribus. I explore the impact of pre-crisis debt 
dynamics on institutions integral to withstanding an economic recession – banks and other financial 
institutions – to gauge the health of these organizations during a recession. Schularick & Taylor (2012) and 
Reinhart & Rogoff (2011b) show that private credit growth might increase the likelihood of a banking 
crisis.3 But, no prior research has determined the individual effect of government leverage on the probability 
 
3 Please see the Section 2: Literature Review section below for discussion of this conclusion. 
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of a banking crisis. Hence, the second research question relates the level of central government debt to the 
likelihood of a banking crisis. By focusing on the effect of government debt on a banking crisis, this thesis 
further explores the real impact of public debt on the stability and health of the economy. 
1.1   Motivation 
The importance of this research is two-fold. First, it addresses the recent rise in government debt 
in both advanced and emerging economies in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and political short-
sightedness. During the pandemic, advanced economy government debt as a fraction of gross domestic 
product (GDP) grew 16 percentage points to 120% by the end of 2020.4 Similarly, emerging market 
economy debt rose 10 percentage points to 64% of GDP.5 These metrics are approaching historic levels. 
Yet politicians are calling for further fiscal stimulus instead of proceeding with caution, even though strong 
employment and retail sales reports suggest that actual output is near potential output.6,7 Hopefully, this 
study serves as a reminder to readers of the importance of balancing deficit-financed economic stimulus 
with the associated risks of excessive borrowing. Second, this research investigates the role and importance 
of central governments in their respective economies. Recessions can be nationwide – sometimes 
worldwide – events. Consequently, it is often the responsibility of central governments to combat and curb 
these events. Central governments often do so by borrowing money and injecting it into the economy. Thus, 
debt is the primary source of funds deployed to combat recessions and bolster the economy. But a lack of 
fiscal policy space to fight a downturn could remove this as a policy option, leaving the recession to rage 
unchecked. This study determines when additional government borrowing may inhibit rather than stimulate 
an economy and place future economic health in peril. Thus, this study deepens the research in the 
macroeconomic subfield of public debt – and its real economic effects. 
1.2   Results 
The advanced economy results confirm existing economic literature and make fresh contributions 
to the economics discipline. First, I confirm pre-crisis dynamics of private credit – both the level and the 
buildup – have a strong, positive relationship with the likelihood of a banking crisis in advanced economies. 
Furthermore, I corroborate that banking recessions have more severe GDP contractions and more persistent 
output declines relative to normal recessions. This confirms the across recession hypothesis for advanced 
economies. At a more granular level, low debt normal recessions experience stronger and faster GDP 
recoveries compared to medium and high debt normal recessions. This confirms the within recession 
hypothesis in advanced economy normal recessions. Turning to government expenditures, banking 
 
4 International Monetary Fund. “Fiscal Monitor: Policies for the Recovery,” April 2021, p. 4. This is a bi-annual publication from 
the International Monetary Fund appraising and recording global macroeconomic conditions and developments. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Rubin, Richard and Eliza Collins. “Biden Proposes $1.9 Trillion Covid-19 Relief Package.” Wall Street Journal, Jan. 15, 2021. 
7 Omeokwe, Amara. “U.S. Unemployment Claims Hit New Covid-19 Pandemic Low.” Wall Street Journal, April 22, 2021. 
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recessions prompt less expansive public spending responses relative to normal recessions. More narrowly, 
low debt normal recessions facilitate stronger public expenditure responses compared to medium and high 
debt normal recessions. This result supports the explanation of fiscal stimulus as the driver of stronger and 
faster per capita GDP growth in low debt normal recessions compared to medium and high debt ones. 
Turning to investment, I verify that banking recessions have more severe and persistent investment 
contractions relative to normal recessions in advanced economies. This confirms the across recession 
hypothesis for advanced economies. Finally, low debt recessions (both normal and banking) have worse 
investment outcomes and slower recoveries compared to medium and high debt ones. For both normal and 
banking recessions, this contradicts the within recession hypothesis. Together with the government 
spending results, these results demonstrate the economic phenomenon of private investment crowding out. 
The emerging economy results also confirm existing economic literature and make new 
contributions to the economics discipline. First, I find pre-crisis dynamics of public debt – both the level 
and the buildup – have a strong, positive relationship with the likelihood of a banking crisis in emerging 
economies. Second, I corroborate that banking recessions have more severe GDP contractions and more 
persistent output declines relative to normal recessions. This result confirms the across recession hypothesis 
for emerging economies. Third, low debt banking recessions experience weaker and slower GDP recoveries 
compared to medium and high debt banking recessions. This contradicts the within recession hypothesis 
for emerging economy banking recessions. Turning to government spending, banking recessions prompt 
no different a public spending response relative to normal recessions. More granularly, low debt recessions 
(both types) facilitate stronger public expenditure responses compared to medium and high debt recessions 
(both types). This result is counterintuitive because GDP per capita outcomes are more negative during 
these low debt recessions than during medium and high debt recessions. Typically, government spending 
improves GDP outcomes. This is clearly not true for emerging economies. Turning to investment, I verify 
that banking recessions have more severe and persistent investment contractions relative to normal 
recessions. This result confirms the across recession hypothesis for emerging economies. More narrowly, 
low debt banking recessions experience worse investment contractions and slower investment recoveries 
compared to medium and high debt recessions. These results contradict the within recession hypothesis. 
Not only do these results illustrate the economic phenomenon of private investment crowding out. They 
also suggest an explanation for weaker and lower per capita GDP growth during low debt banking 
recessions compared to medium and high debt ones: private investment has a greater social marginal benefit 
than public investment in emerging economies. 
Section 2:  Literature Review 
Studies focusing more broadly on the real impacts of debt accumulation on an economy have been 
a part of economic literature for over a decade. This topic receives particular focus from economists since 
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the Great Recession marred world economies in the later 2000s. The main question driving this line of 
research is as follows: how does debt accumulation – both private credit and public leverage – affect the 
real components of an economy? Economists began to focus more intensely on the real economic effects 
of banking crises since the collapse of major financial institutions – like Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers 
– during this same time period. The main question driving this line of study is as follows: what are the real 
effects of a banking crisis on an economy? However, there remains a dearth of research that links the real 
effects during a recession of pre-recession debt accumulation and the real effects of banking crises. Thus, 
research measuring the potential economic costs of elevated debt levels during banking recessions is 
limited, though interest in this narrow field of macroeconomic research is growing. 
2.1   How does debt accumulation affect the real components of an economy? 
Economic research concentrating on the real effects of private credit accumulation on an economy 
began in earnest after the Great Recession. Schularick & Taylor (2012) develop an essential dataset 
recording information annually on private credit, money supply, price levels, investment, and other 
macroeconomic indicators of 14 developed nations over roughly 140 years. The authors find – using logistic 
regression with country fixed effects – that lagged private credit growth is a highly significant indicator of 
a banking crisis. Jordà et al. (2011) study the same 14 developed nations over a 140-year period using 
nonparametric methods to understand the behavior of various key economic and financial variables in the 
years leading up to a banking crisis. Their study confirms that private credit growth was elevated before 
both global banking crises (synchronized crises across many countries) and national banking crises 
(isolated, single country crises). They conclude that increased private credit growth was the best predictive 
signal of financial market instability. 
Reinhart & Rogoff (2011b) examine 70 countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, North 
America, and Oceania over the longest time periods possible given the available data. They find that rising 
private leverage increases the likelihood of a banking crisis, which itself is a significant predictor of a 
sovereign debt crisis. Most recently, Jordá et al. (2016) expand on Jordà et al. (2011) by increasing their 
original 14-country, advanced nation dataset to included 17 advanced economies over this same 140-year 
period. The authors add information on public debt, investment, price levels, and other macroeconomic 
indicators into the dataset. They use logistic regression to confirm that private sector credit buildups are a 
significant predictor of banking crises. The authors also use a local projection (LP) method to confirm that 
once a country enters a recession, if it carries the legacy of elevated private credit levels, then the post-
recession output path is adversely affected with deeper losses and slower growth. Finally, the authors 
conclude that the combination of private credit booms and high public debt deepen output contractions 
during banking recessions and retard growth during the recovery periods. 
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Another major strand of the literature explores the relationship between public debt and economic 
output during a recession. Reinhart & Rogoff (2011a) cursorily address this relationship. In their research, 
the authors unearth a vast trove of domestic public debt data and then combine it with existing external 
government debt data to compile a database recording government leverage levels for 64 economies 
extending back to the 19th century. They note that domestic public debt accounts for roughly two-thirds of 
total public debt, explaining why many countries default on their external debts at seemingly low debt 
thresholds. Reinhart et al. (2012) employ the same dataset to identify major public debt overhang periods 
(when government debt exceeds 90 percent of nominal GDP on a sustained basis). The authors conclude 
that such public debt overhang periods are associated with much slower GDP growth; the average annual 
real GDP growth rate is 1.2 percentage points lower than in periods where the public debt to GDP ratio is 
less than 90 percent. Furthermore, these debt overhang periods typically extend for long durations (over a 
decade), suggesting the cumulative GDP shortfall from public debt overhang is potentially massive.  
Romer & Romer (2019) study 24 member countries in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) over a roughly 140-year period (1870 – 2017). They find that countries with 
low debt-to-GDP ratios on the eve of a financial crisis experience only moderate downturns in output, 
whereas nations with high debt-to-GDP ratios suffer larger output declines following a financial crisis. The 
authors also show that countries with greater fiscal policy space (lower debt-to-GDP ratios) at the outset of 
a financial crisis respond with more expansionary fiscal policy to combat the crisis. Koh et al. (2020) expand 
on this field of study by examining 100 emerging market economies over a roughly 50-year period (since 
the early 1970’s). The authors find that government debt accumulation episodes that coincide with a 
financial crisis are typically associated with weaker economic outcomes; specifically, GDP per capita is 10 
percent lower than in debt accumulation episodes without a crisis. Furthermore, financial crises with rapid 
government debt buildups feature worse output – and investment – per capita contractions than crises with 
rapid private credit buildups. The authors then employ a random effects logistic regression technique to 
estimate the linkage between debt accumulation and the probability of a financial crisis, finding that a 
combined private and government debt buildup significantly increases the probability of a financial crisis.  
2.2   What are the real effects of a banking crisis on an economy, ceteris paribus? 
The question of the link between real and nominal variables has long been of interest to theoretical 
and empirical economists. Bordo et al. (2001) complete one of the foundational studies on banking crises 
and the macroeconomy. The authors develop and analyse a dataset spanning 120 years (1880 – 2000); they 
collect data for 21 advanced nations that extends back to 1880 and data for 56 economies for the post-1973 
period. The authors generate descriptive statistics about the frequency and severity of banking crises, 
showing that both the frequency and severity (output losses) of banking crises has not changed drastically 
 7 
over this 120-year period. The authors also note that economies suffer larger output losses in recessions 
with banking crises than in recessions without them. 
First released as a working paper at the onset of the Great Recession, Reinhart & Rogoff (2013) 
use a core sample of 66 nations to show the historical frequency of banking crises is quite similar between 
advanced and emerging economies, opposing traditional economic thought at the time. They descriptively 
confirm that banking crises induce output contractions in an economy. Finally, the authors find the declines 
in central government revenue due to a banking crisis to be strikingly similar between advanced and 
emerging economies. Reinhart & Rogoff (2009) supplement this study further by including a handful of 
additional emerging market economies, with associated banking crises. The authors generate the following 
findings: banking crises induce deep and prolonged asset market collapses and real housing price declines, 
banking crises produce declines in real GDP per capita and employment levels, and banking crises create 
large increases in the real value of government debt due to the collapse of tax revenues. Schularick & Taylor 
(2012) focus more narrowly on advanced economies and find that the economic impact of banking crises 
was similar across the pre-war (pre-WWII) and post-war (post-WWII) periods, even though monetary 
policy responses in advanced economies have been more aggressive after 1945.  
More recently, Romer & Romer (2017) study 24 OECD advanced economies during the post-
WWII period. They construct a novel semiannual series identifying financial distress in these nations using 
historical, narrative sources. The authors estimate the real GDP per capita decreases after the onset of 
financial distress, finding that these output declines are statistically significant and persistent – but moderate 
in size (peak decline of 6 percent). Romer & Romer (2018) expand on their 2017 paper by incorporating 
the role of macroeconomic policy (both fiscal and monetary policy) into their analysis on the aftermath of 
financial crises. They regress real GDP on a variety of macroeconomic variables while including time and 
country fixed effects. The authors find that the degree of fiscal policy space (the debt-to-GDP) ratio has a 
statistically significant effect on the aftermath of financial crises; economies without fiscal policy space 
experience a maximum decline in GDP of 8.1%, whereas economies with fiscal policy space only contract 
1.4%. Furthermore, the authors discover that financial distress is less persistent in the presence of 
macroeconomic policy space. Laeven & Valencia (2018) update their original 2008 study. The authors 
compile a chronology of banking crises for a comprehensive set of countries from 1970 to 2018, which 
serves as the standard reference for macroeconomists studying banking crises. They find that high income 
countries undergo larger output losses due to banking crises than those experienced by low-income nations. 
2.3   Motivating Paper 
Among all the published literature, Jordà et al. (2013) is the only study scrutinizing the economic 
output costs of elevated debt levels during banking recessions. This study serves as the benchmark study 
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examining the relationship between pre-recession debt accumulation and banking recessions.8 The authors 
confirm that banking recessions have larger GDP per capita declines than those associated with normal 
recessions. In other words, banking recessions are more painful than normal recessions. Prior empirical, 
economic studies confirm this more general prediction – banking recessions induce worse economic 
declines than normal recessions. But, this prior work does not separate output declines by preexisting debt 
level. This paper does exactly that – with private credit. The authors show more credit (private debt) 
intensive expansions are followed by deeper recessions and slower recoveries. In other words, the private 
credit level in an economy preceding a recession is closely associated with the severity of the subsequent 
recession, for both types of recessions (banking and normal). This second empirical analysis is the analysis 
my thesis replicates, with government leverage substituting for private credit.  
2.4   Contributions to Existing Literature 
In sum, an extensive literature has assessed various aspects of the relationship between debt and 
economic cycles, but key issues remain unresolved. My research contributes to the existing macroeconomic 
literature by focusing on government debt within the context of two types of recessions: banking and normal 
recessions. While Jordà et al. (2013) examine private credit levels within the context of banking recessions, 
this research measures the effect of preexisting public debt levels on banking recession paths. No other 
study has completed this analysis, to my knowledge. Moreover, this research also investigates the effect of 
government debt on other macroeconomic outcomes: investment per capita and government expenditures. 
Regardless of the results, this study has interesting implications. Either heightened levels of public leverage 
worsen macroeconomic outcomes during a recession, thus confirming the suggested economic theory that 
a government’s inability to borrow funds prevents it from quelling depositor worries, easing money 
demand, and stimulating economic growth. Or heightened levels of government debt are associated with 
economic impacts during a recession no different from those associated with lower levels of public debt. 
This latter finding would suggest that economic growth and depositor worries – and by extension money 
demand – are not influenced by a government’s ability, or inability, to engage in fiscal stimulus.  
Additionally, this research contributes to the existing literature by econometrically exploring the 
relationship between public debt and the likelihood of a banking crisis. Although other research (namely 
Koh et al. (2020)) previously addresses this relationship in emerging economies, this thesis employs a 
comprehensive dataset that includes both emerging and developed economies. Furthermore, this thesis 
incorporates recently unearthed data – particularly for emerging economies – that has not been utilized in 
the prior research. Regardless of the results, this study has interesting implications. Either higher 
government leverage increases the likelihood of a banking crisis, suggesting that governments actively 
 
8 Recall that a banking-crisis recession is the coincidence of a banking crisis and a business cycle peak in a four-year window. 
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prevent a nascent banking failure from expanding into a national or global catastrophe through targeted 
support. Or the level of public debt does not have an impact on the probability of a banking crisis. This 
latter finding indicates inefficacy of government support in preventing a period of localized financial 
instability from becoming broader financial distress.  
The econometric analyses executed in this study are also unique to the field. I complete both a 
narrow, long set of regressions (17 advanced economies covering 1870-2017) and a wide, short set of 
regressions (68 emerging economies covering 1970-2017). The narrow, long regressions focus on 
developed economies, taking advantage of the deep historical information available on these nations. The 
wide, short regressions incorporate emerging economies. At its essence, this research contributes to the 
field by utilizing a similar methodology and running similar regressions to existing literature but on two 
different types of countries: advanced economies and emerging economies. Hence, this thesis illuminates 
and explains intriguing differences between advanced nations and their emerging counterparts.  
Section 3:  Data 
To study the dynamics of public leverage, output, and investment in both advanced economies and 
emerging economies, I employ two datasets – one for each type of economy. The advanced economy dataset 
covers 17 advanced nations over the years 1870-2017 at an annual frequency. Hence, the observational unit 
is a country-year. The countries include Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States, representing an overwhelming share of advanced economy GDP during the sample period. 
The emerging economy dataset covers 68 emerging economies across Africa, Asia, Europe, Oceana, the 
Middle East, the Caribbean, Central America, and South America over the years 1970-2017 at an annual 
frequency. Similar to the advanced economy dataset, the observational unit is a country-year. These 
countries represent a vast cross-section of emerging nations across the globe, ensuring a comprehensive 
and complete foundation from which to draw inferences and make conclusions. For a full list of emerging 
economies, please see the Appendix.  
3.1   Advanced Economies 
For each country (17 advanced economies), I assemble national accounts data covering nominal 
GDP, real GDP, and real GDP per capita. I complement this information with measurements of gross fixed 
capital formation (investment), price levels, inflation, consumption, and the trade balance – among other 
macroeconomic variables. The current account information is broken out individually into imports and 
exports. Financial data includes both short-term interest rates (usually a 3-month tenor) and long-term 
interest rates (usually a 5-year tenor). I fold government fiscal information – including revenues and 
expenditures measured in nominal terms – into the dataset. Private credit information covers domestic bank 
loans to various cross-sections of the economy. Most importantly, I incorporate measurements of each 
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country’s public debt to GDP ratio – government leverage as a fraction of GDP. The majority of the 
information is from the Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor Microhistory Database (Jordà et al. (2017)), published 
by the European Research Council. I use the fifth release of this statistical database, published in March 
2021. Measurements of government leverage from Reinhart & Rogoff (2011b) and of investment from 
Mitchell (2007) complement the original database. 
I source the chronology of systemic banking crises within each advanced country from Jordà et al. 
(2017). A bank crisis is defined as an event during which a country’s banking sector experiences bank runs, 
sharp increases in default rates accompanied by large losses of capital that result in public intervention, 
bankruptcy, bank liquidations, or the forced merger of major financial institutions. I operationalize this 
definition by applying two criteria to a situation. Firstly, a country’s banking system must endure severe 
losses, defined as when either (i) a country’s banking system exhibits significant losses resulting in a share 
of nonperforming loans above 20 percent of total loans or bank closures of at least 20 percent of banking 
system assets or (ii) fiscal restructuring costs of the banking sector are sufficiently high, exceeding 5 percent 
of GDP. Additionally, a country’s banking system must experience significant policy intervention, where 
significant is defined as the implementation at least three of the following six policy measures: (i) deposit 
freezes and/or bank holidays, (ii) significant bank nationalizations, (iii) bank restructuring fiscal costs (at 
least 3 percent of GDP), (iv) extensive liquidity support (at least 5 percent of deposits and liabilities to 
nonresidents), (v) significant guarantees put in place, and (vi) significant asset purchases (at least 5 percent 
of GDP). These categories cover all policy interventions that have been previously employed to resolve a 
banking crisis. Thus, this method records the year in which a country enters a banking crisis. This approach 
to date banking crises reduces the use of subjective criteria in identifying these events and follows the 
technique utilized by Laeven & Valencia (2018), who label these events “systemic” banking crises. This 
approach maintains consistency with other methods of dating crises. 
At the outset, it is helpful to note some salient properties of the advanced economy data before 
diving deeper into the analysis. Table 1.1 presents a summary of the critical variables in the dataset. In total, 
there are 2,516 observations (country-years). Within the sample, there are 371 recession years, 279 of which 
are normal recessions and 92 of which are banking recessions. Real GDP per capita averages an index value 
of 38.32 across all country-years (column 1). Focusing only on the country-years coinciding with a business 
cycle peak, column 3, real GDP per capita averages an index value of 30.38. Thus, GDP per capita is on 
average lower at the onset of a recession compared to all country-years in the sample. Breaking down real 
GDP per capita based on type of recession reveals additional insight. Average GDP per capita is lower at 
the onset of a normal recession, 29.72 (column 5), compared to a banking recession, 32.38 (column 7). The 
government debt to GDP ratio averages 54.4% (column 1) for all country-years in the sample. Interestingly, 
average government leverage to GDP equals a lower 52.0% for all business cycle peaks in the sample 
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(column 3). This statistic suggests prima facie evidence that debt-financed fiscal stimulus is not driving the 
economic expansions of these advanced economies during the past 140 years. Moreover, this ratio is even 
lower, on average, at the onset of recessions that coincide with a banking crisis, with an average value 
equaling 49.7% (column 7). The average public debt to GDP ratio at the onset of a normal recession equals 
a higher 52.7% (column 5), but this value is still lower than the complete sample average. In short, these 
summary statistics show little prima facie in support of the hypothesis that heightened public leverage levels 
precipitate banking crises in advanced economies. 
3.2   Emerging Economies 
For each country (68 advanced economies), I assemble national accounts data covering real GDP 
and real GDP per capita. I complement this information with measurements of gross fixed capital formation 
(investment), price levels, consumption, and the trade balance – among other macroeconomic variables. 
The current account information is broken out individually into imports and exports. Unlike the advanced 
economy dataset, financial data on both short-term interest rates (usually a 3-month tenor) and long-term 
interest rates (usually a 5-year tenor) is unavailable. I fold government fiscal information – including 
expenditures measured in real terms – into the dataset. Private credit information covers bank loans and 
other debt extended to various cross-sections of the economy. Most importantly, I include measurements 
of each country’s public debt to GDP ratio – government leverage as a fraction of GDP. The above 
information originates from two sources: the February 18, 2021 update of Feenstra et al. (2015) and Mbaye 
et al. (2018). Version 10.0 of the Penn World Table – cited as Feenstra et al. (2015) and most recently 
published in early 2021 – provides the information concerning real GDP, real GDP per capita, investment, 
and all other macroeconomic data, except public debt data. The Global Debt Database – published by the 
International Monetary Fund most recently in 2018 and cited as Mbaye et al. (2018) – supplies the requisite 
general government debt information. 
I source the chronology of systemic banking crises within each emerging country from Laeven & 
Valencia (2018). This is the third release of their original 2008 paper and is the most current version. The 
definition of a bank crisis for this emerging economy dataset is identical to the definition used for the 
advanced economy dataset. Similarly, I operationalize this definition in an equivalent manner to above. 
At the outset, it is helpful to note some salient properties of the emerging economy data before 
diving deeper into analysis. Table 2.1 presents a summary of the critical variables in the dataset. In total, 
there are 3,332 observations (country-years). Within the sample, there are 471 recession years, 430 of which 
are normal recessions and 41 of which are banking recessions. Real GDP per capita averages a value of 
$8,931.85 across all country-years (column 1). Focusing only on the country-years coinciding with a 
business cycle peak, column 3, real GDP per capita averages a value of $8,404.66. Thus, GDP per capita is 
on average lower at the onset of a recession compared to all country-years in the sample. Breaking down 
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real GDP per capita by type of recession reveals additional insight. Average GDP per capita is lower at the 
onset of a normal recession, $7,921.47 (column 5), compared to a banking recession, $13,472.21 (column 
7). The government debt to GDP ratio averages 50.1% (column 1) for all country-years in the sample. 
Interestingly, average government leverage to GDP equals a lower 47.7% for all business cycle peaks in 
the sample (column 3). This statistic suggests prima facie evidence that debt-financed fiscal stimulus is not 
driving the economic expansions of these emerging economies during the past ~50 years. Moreover, this 
ratio is even lower, on average, at the onset of recessions that coincide with a banking crisis, with an average 
value equaling 47.2% (column 7). The average public debt to GDP ratio at the onset of a normal recession 
equals a slightly higher 47.7% (column 5), but this value is still lower than the complete sample average. 
In short, these summary statistics indicate little prima facie in support of the hypothesis that heightened 
government leverage levels precipitate banking crises in emerging economies. 
3.3   Both Advanced Economy and Emerging Economy Datasets 
The two core definitions of debt are as follows. I define Total/Gross Government/Public 
Debt/Leverage as the end-of-year amount of total debt liabilities of a government with both domestic and 
foreign creditors. The “government” normally comprises the central administration (or central/federal 
government), provincial government (or state government), and all other entities that borrow with an 
explicit government guarantee, including town and municipality governments. I define Total/Gross Private 
Credit/Debt as the end-of-year amount of outstanding domestic currency lending by domestic banks to 
domestic households and nonfinancial corporations – total loans to the non-financial private sector. For 
further relevant definitions of key debt terms, please see the Debt Glossary section of the Appendix. 
Most nations do not have agencies that determine turning points in economic activity or date 
business cycles. Following many prior studies, I employ the Bry & Boschan (1971) algorithm, the closest 
algorithmic interpretation of the NBER’s definition of a recession, to date business cycle peaks. Using real 
GDP per capita, the algorithm searches for local minima – labelling these years as trough years – and for 
local maxima – labelling these years as peak years. The algorithm also records the length of the recession. 
Recessions – peak to trough – are sorted into two types: those associated with banking crises (banking 
recessions) and those not associated with banking crises (normal recessions). 
I use Jordà et al. (2011) as a model to define normal recessions and banking-crisis recessions, or 
recessions that coincide with a banking crisis. “Banking-crisis recessions” occur whenever a banking crisis 
erupts within a four-year window around a business cycle peak and are referred to as banking recessions 
for brevity. I code all other recessions as “normal recessions.” This classification method is imperfect but 
generally satisfactory. The four-year window introduces some noise into the data, as some recessions may 
get misclassified. For instance, two recessions may occur within a five-year span, one of which is associated 
with a banking crisis while the other is not. The banking crisis may begin exactly between these two 
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recessions. Thus, both recessions get classified as a banking recession, though in actuality only one is truly 
a banking recession. Furthermore, an enduring banking crisis (extending over a decade) may only be linked 
to one recession, when in actuality it should be associated with all recessions over the decade. Hence, this 
is not a perfect, but rather a pretty good, method. 
The chronology of business cycle peaks in the 17 advanced countries is shown in Table A.3, where 
“N” denotes a normal peak, and “B” denotes a peak associated with a systemic banking crisis. There are 
371 peaks identified over the years 1870-2017 in the 17-country sample, with 279 of those peaks being 
normal peaks and 92 of those peaks being banking peaks. However, the usable sample is curtailed in later 
empirical analyses because data during the World Wars is excluded and further curtailed due to 
discontinuities of other variables. The chronology of business cycle peaks in the 68 emerging economies is 
shown in Table A.4, where “N” denotes a normal peak, and “B” denotes a peak associated with a systemic 
banking crisis. There are 471 peaks identified over the years 1970-2017 in the 68-country sample, with 430 
of those peaks being normal peaks and 41 of those peaks being banking peaks. Similar to the advanced 
economy dataset, my later emerging economy empirical analyses employ a smaller subset of this 
information due to discontinuities of certain macroeconomic variables. 
Section 4:  Economic Theory and Econometric Methodology 
4.1   Underlying Economic Theory 
It is useful to understand the economic theory underpinning the secondary purpose of this thesis at 
the outset. Economic theory predicts that higher levels of government leverage increase the probability of 
a banking crisis. Typically, a government with fiscal policy space can bail out a failing financial institution 
and can contain the effects of this failure from spreading through financial markets. However, a government 
with little fiscal policy space (elevated levels of public debt) may be unable to borrow the necessary funds 
to prevent a banking contagion. Thus, an over-levered government may be incapable of preventing a local, 
nascent banking crisis from turning into a full-fledged, national – or even global – one. To recapitulate, 
economic theory predicts that higher levels of government debt increase the likelihood of a banking crisis. 
Furthermore, economic theory suggests that elevated government leverage levels at the onset of a 
recessionary period induce worse economic outcomes. The easiest means to understand this prediction is 
the standard, closed-economy IS-LM model. During a normal recession, an exogenous contraction in 
economic output can be mitigated by an increase in government spending. Examining general equilibrium 
shows that the IS curve shifts leftward initially due to the exogenous contraction in the goods market. 
Equilibrium output falls as a result. I model an increase in government spending as an upward shift in the 
planned expenditure curve in the goods market. An increase in planned expenditures has an effect on the 
IS (Investment = Savings) curve in general equilibrium. Namely, the IS curve shifts rightward. Thus, 
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equilibrium output returns to pre-recession levels and deficit-financed government stimulus can naturally 
combat an exogenous shock to the economy. 
But if a government has excessively elevated levels of debt at the onset of a recession, it may be 
restricted – in part or in whole – from borrowing to stimulate the economy. Hence, high levels of public 
debt block the pathway facilitating the return of economic output to pre-recession levels. The economy 
remains stuck at a depressed output level. High preexisting levels of government debt at the outset of a 
normal recession worsen economic contractions during the recessionary period. Thus, I hypothesize that 
real macroeconomic outcomes are more severely depressed in high debt normal recessions compared to 
low debt normal recessions. This is the “within recession” hypothesis. This thesis measures the output losses 
associated with varying levels of public debt preceding a normal recession. 
Economic theory suggests that the addition of a banking crisis further magnifies the real output 
decline during a recession. Again, the easiest means to understand this prediction is the standard, closed 
economy IS-LM model. The instability and stress on financial markets, and the financial system more 
broadly, associated with a banking crisis encourages citizens to hold more currency and increases money 
demand. Thus, a banking crisis increases demand for liquidity in the money market. I notate this demand 
increase as rightward shift of the money demand curve. An increase in money demand has an effect on the 
LM (Liquidity = Money) curve in general equilibrium, shifting the LM curve leftward. For clarity, the IS 
curve initially shifts leftward due to the exogenous contraction in the goods market. The LM curve 
simultaneously shifts leftward due to increased money demand as a result of the banking crisis. The dual 
leftward shifts of the IS and LM curves severely depress equilibrium output. As mentioned previously, 
deficit-financed government stimulus can naturally combat an exogenous shock to the goods market. This 
shifts the IS curve rightward, to its pre-recession location. Furthermore, governments with fiscal policy 
space (low levels of debt) can support ailing industries in times of crisis, like purchasing toxic bank assets 
(e.g. Troubled Asset Relief Program), to ensure banks can cover deposit liabilities and to calm public 
concerns. This assistance instills confidence in the financial system, which in turn reduces money demand 
and shifts the LM curve rightward. Thus, output returns to pre-recession levels and deficit-financed 
government aid can combat financial distress brought on by a banking crisis.  
However, high public debt levels may prevent a government from borrowing the necessary money 
to support – or in the extreme case, bail out – financial institutions affected by a banking crisis. Thus, high 
levels of public debt block the pathway to calm depositor worries and to facilitate a decrease in money 
demand. Hence, economic output remains severely depressed during a banking recession. High preexisting 
levels of government debt at the outset of a banking recession worsen economic contractions during the 
following recession. Similar to above, I hypothesize that real macroeconomic outcomes are more severely 
depressed in high debt banking recessions compared to low debt banking recessions. I also designate this 
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prediction the “within recession” hypothesis. This thesis measures the output losses associated with varying 
thresholds of public debt preceding a banking recession. 
Economic theory suggests that output falls more severely during banking recessions than during 
normal recessions, ceteris paribus. In normal recessions, governments need only combat the exogenous 
contraction in the goods market. In banking recessions, governments must combat the exogenous 
contraction in the goods market and the financial instability and distress associated with a banking crisis. 
Often, governments react with deficit-financed fiscal stimulus. As with all things, there come diminishing 
marginal returns to government spending. Even with fiscal support in both the goods market and the 
financial markets, the addition of banking instability has unavoidable systematic effects. This additional 
effect of financial market instability drives the discrepancy between output declines in normal recessions 
versus banking recessions. This is seen rather clearly during high debt recessions modeled in Figures 3 and 
4 in the Appendix. Figure 3 depicts a normal recession with elevated preexisting levels of public leverage, 
and Figure 4 depicts a banking recession with elevated preexisting levels of government debt. The output 
decline in Figure 4 (from point A to point C) outstrips that of Figure 3 (from point A to point B). Hence, 
banking recessions have more severe and persistent declines compared to normal recessions. Thus, I 
hypothesize that real macroeconomic outcomes are more severely depressed in banking recessions 
compared to normal recessions. This is the “across recession” hypothesis. 
In sum, economic theory yields two main predictions. First, real economic outcomes decline more 
severely and persistently during banking recessions than normal recessions. This is referred to as the “across 
recession” prediction. Second, real macroeconomic outcomes decline more severely and persistently during 
recessions (both types) associated with high preexisting public debt levels than during recessions (both 
types) associated low preexisting public debt levels. This is referred to as the “within recession” prediction. 
4.2   Econometric Methodology 
I employ various econometric techniques to analyze each dataset. First, I use a series of standard 
level-level linear regressions to estimate the likelihood of a banking crisis dependent on various 
combinations of explanatory variables. Then, I use a series of standard log-level multiple linear regressions 
to estimate the effects of government debt levels on various macroeconomic aggregates during both normal 
and banking recessions over a 5-year forward period. These simple methods rely on the, relatively complex, 
local projection (LP) approach introduced in Jordà (2005) to forecast the short-term behavior of the various 
macroeconomic aggregates of interest. The LP method complements the straightforward econometric 
strategies because standard models are too parametrically intensive for the available sample. Moreover, the 
macroeconomic explanatory variables of interest allow for asymmetrical and nonlinear relationships with 
the dependent variable via the level of debt at the onset of the recession. These features are difficult to 
model with other standard econometric practices. Whereas modelling these nonparametric characteristics 
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is relatively straightforward with the LP method. Hence, direct local analysis of the macroeconomic 
variables of interest through the LP method is the most straightforward technique. Furthermore, this 
procedure ensures consistency with the existing literature. Consequently, I use the LP approach. 
4.2.1   Predicting Banking Crises Regressions 
This series of regressions measures the effect of public debt and private credit on the likelihood of 
a banking crisis. They support my secondary purpose: determining whether the intensity of government 
borrowing affects the likelihood of a banking crisis. I execute seven regressions, for both the advanced and 
the emerging economy datasets, using a level-level linear functional form. The observational unit for these 
regressions is a country-year and country fixed effects are included in all regressions, accounting for time-
invariant cross-country variation in the sample. The dependent variable remains the same across all seven 
regressions: a banking crisis indicator variable, recording the year in which a country enters a banking 
crisis. The explanatory variables in these regressions capture macroeconomic debt qualities prior to the 
onset of a recession. These variables of interest are the demeaned levels of private credit / GDP and public 
debt / GDP. I consider specifications including the contemporaneous values, lagged values, and growth 
rates for each variable alone and in combination. 
The following equation is the general regression specification, with all other regressions imposing 
some variation of restrictions. 
P(BC) = F(ßPRIV,t (PRIVi,t – PRIVi ) + ßPRIV,t–1 (PRIVi,t–1 – PRIVi ) + ßPUB,t (PUBi,t – PUBi ) + ßPUB,t–1 
(PUBi,t–1 – PUBi ) + ai + ui,t ) 
BC denotes the banking crisis indicator variable, PRIVi,t denotes the private credit / GDP ratio of country i 
at time t, PRIVi  denotes the average value of private credit / GDP for country i over the historical period,  
PUBi,t denotes the public debt / GDP ratio of country i at time t, PUBi  denotes the average value of public 
debt / GDP for country i over the historical period, ai are country fixed effects, and u is the error term. 
I utilize logistic regression to estimate how the intensity of government borrowing affects the 
likelihood of a banking crisis, ceteris paribus. This method accounts for the binary nature of the dependent 
variable – the banking crisis indicator variable. Logistic regression ensures that all fitted values remain 
between 0 and 1. This is preferable as a predicted value for BC exceeding 1 or less than 0 is not interpretable. 
However, the drawback to logistic regression is the coefficients do not equal their marginal effects. 
4.2.2   Replication of Existing Advanced Economy Results 
This series of regressions replicates the results about advanced economies from existing economic 
literature, namely Jordà et al. (2013). These results confirm GDP per capita contracts more severely and for 
a longer duration during a banking recession compared to a normal recession. 
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The dependent variable I examine in these regressions is the change in log real GDP per capita (y) 
from the business cycle peak year (h = 0) to year h (where h = 1,…, 5) multiplied by 100. In other words, 
the dependent variable is the h period ahead percent change in real GDP per capita from the onset of the 
recession. The data on y are from Jordà et al. (2017) for advanced economies and Feenstra et al. (2015) 
(Penn World Table) for emerging economies, and I use the Bry & Boschan (1971) algorithm to code 
business cycle peaks and troughs. The explanatory variables are the binary indicator variables for normal 
and banking recessions. 
In harmony with Jordà et al. (2013), I measure the recession path of y to a discrete recession 
treatment (N or B) at time t with the following panel regression:9 
Δhyi,t+h = qN N + qB B + ui,t;   i = 1,…,14; h = 1,…,5 
where qN is the coefficient associated with normal recession treatment (N = 1), qB is the coefficient 
associated with banking recession treatment (B = 1), and u is the error term. The treatment effects (q’s) are 
the chief coefficients of interest and represent the recession path for the cumulated response of GDP per 
capita to each recession treatment, N = 1 or B = 1. This regression does not have a constant or intercept 
term because the two explanatory variables are multicollinear (N + B = 1).   
 I employ the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) technique to estimate the coefficients of each log-level 
specification. I use OLS because the coefficients are consistent if the model if correctly specified, even in 
the presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown fractional form. To correct for possible heteroskedasticity, I 
calculate Huber-Eicker-White robust standard errors to assess statistical significance.  
4.2.3   Recession Path Regressions with Key Macroeconomic Aggregates as Outcome Variables 
The next set of regressions measure how the intensity of preexisting government leverage impacts 
real macroeconomic variables (GDP, investment, and government expenditures) during a subsequent 
recessionary period. They support the primary purpose of the thesis: quantifying the economic costs of 
heightened, preexisting government debt on real macroeconomic variables during both normal and banking 
recessions. These regressions use a log-level linear functional form to measure the effect of public debt on 
real macroeconomic aggregates. The observational unit for these regressions is a country-year. 
In the first series of regressions, the dependent variable is the change in log real GDP per capita of 
country i from year 0 to year h multiplied by 100, denoted by Δhyi,t+h. More simply, the dependent variable 
is the percent change in real GDP per capita from the onset of the recession. The normalization implies the 
peak year level of log real GDP per capita is set to zero and deviations from that reference are measured in 
log points times 100. The explanatory variables in these regressions capture government debt qualities prior 
to the onset of a recession. These variables include the binary indicator variables for normal and banking 
 
9 This corresponds to the “unconditional local projections” from Jordà et al. (2013), Table 5. 
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recessions and the interaction of these binary indicator variables with government debt levels broken into 
terciles. This produces six explanatory variables in total: each of {Low, Med, High} times each of {N, B}. 
Terciles are calculated in two different ways. The within country tercile method focuses on public 
leverage within each individual country. Thus, I examine the public debt / GDP ratio over the whole 
historical period – 1870 to 2017 for advanced nations and 1970 to 2017 for emerging nations – for country 
i. I then classify each country-year into Low Debt, Medium Debt, or High Debt bins according to the 
country-specific ranges. The across country tercile procedure focuses on the public debt / GDP ratio during 
only recession years but across the whole sample. So, debt terciles for the normal recession interactions 
terms are calculated by generating tercile ranges using public debt information during normal recession 
years; and debt terciles for the banking recession interactions terms are calculated using public debt 
information during banking recession years. This across country methodology follows existing practices in 
Jordà et al. (2013) and is employed in one robustness regression for literary consistency. I exclusively 
employ the within country method throughout the remainder of the paper because it accounts for systematic 
variation between nations not incorporated into the across country method. This within country method also 
uses a greater number of country-year observations to generate the tercile ranges, improving the quality of 
this binning procedure. More generally, the binning process allows me to analyze the effects of government 
debt at a more granular level within a type of recession (e.g. low debt normal versus high debt normal) and 
across types of recession (e.g. low debt normal versus low debt banking). 
Similar to the replication regressions, I aim to measure the recession path of the cumulated response 
of the dependent variable y (GDP per capita) to a treatment x at time t: 
CR(Δhyi,t+h, d) = Ei,t (Δhyi,t+h | xi,t = 𝑥 + d) – Ei,t (Δhyi,t+h | xi,t = 𝑥),  h = 1,…,5 
where CR(Δhyi,t+h, d) denotes the average cumulated response of y across countries and recession types, h 
periods into the future, given a d size change in the treatment variable x (relative to its mean). In principle, 
x could be a discrete or continuous treatment. In these regressions, the explanatory variables include the 
interactions of the normal and banking (N, B) recession indicators with the level of government leverage as 
discrete treatments. In practice, I estimate CR(Δhyi,t+h, d) by assuming the expectation can be approximated 
by a local projection using the panel of countries i = 1,…, 17 and years t = 1870,…, 2017 for advanced 
economies and the panel of countries i = 1,…, 68 and years t = 1970,…, 2017 for emerging economies. 
Thus, I measure the recession path of y at time t with the following panel regression: 
Δhyi,t+h = qN,low (N ´ lowi,t ) + qN,med (N ´ medi,t ) + qN,high (N ´ highi,t ) + 
qB,low (B ´ lowi,t ) + qB,med (B ´ medi,t ) + qB,high (B ´ highi,t ) +  
ui,t        i = 1,…, I; h = 1,…,5 
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where qN,* is the coefficient associated with normal recession treatment (N = 1) interacted with * tercile of 
government leverage, qB,* is the coefficient associated with banking recession treatment (B = 1) interacted 
with * tercile of government leverage, and u is the error term. The treatment effects (q’s) are the chief 
coefficients of interest and represent the recession path for the cumulated response of GDP per capita to 
each type of recession treatment. These regression does not have a constant or intercept term because the 
explanatory variables are multicollinear. 
Two additional series of regressions measure how the intensity of preexisting government leverage 
systematically relates to real macroeconomic aggregates during a subsequent recessionary period. These 
regressions use the same log-level linear functional form. As discussed in the Underlying Economic Theory 
section, theory suggests if a country responds to a recession with countercyclical fiscal stimulus then we 
should observe partial crowding out of private investment as r rises and I falls. I run the same specification 
with investment and government expenditures as the dependent variables to test for such responses and 
effects. For the investment regressions, the dependent variable is Δhwi,t+h, the change in log real investment 
per capita of country i from year 0 to year h multiplied by 100. This is the percent change in real investment 
per capita from year 0 to year h. In the government expenditure regressions, the dependent variable is 
ΔhGi,t+h, the percent change in government expenditures of country i from year 0 to year h. The treatment 
effects (q’s) are the coefficients of interest and represent the recession path for the macroeconomic 
aggregates (investment and government expenditures) to each type of recession treatment. 
For robustness, another series of regressions use country fixed effects. Thus, the recession path of 
y (GDP, investment, and government expenditures) to a discrete recession treatment at time t is also 
estimated with the following panel regression: 
Δhyi,t+h = qN,low (N ´ lowi,t ) + qN,med (N ´ medi,t ) + qN,high (N ´ highi,t ) + 
qB,low (B ´ lowi,t ) + qB,med (B ´ medi,t ) + qB,high (B ´ highi,t ) +  
ai + ui,t       i = 1,…, I; h = 1,…,5 
where the coefficients have equivalent interpretations as above and ai are country fixed effects. These 
regressions include country fixed effects to account for cross-country variation and systematic differences 
between the countries in the sample. These regression does not have a constant or intercept term because 
the two explanatory variables are multicollinear. 
I employ the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) technique to estimate the coefficients of each log-level 
specification. I use OLS because the coefficients are consistent if the model if correctly specified, even in 
the presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown fractional form. To correct for possible heteroskedasticity, I 
calculate Huber-Eicker-White robust standard errors to assess statistical significance. 
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Section 5:  Results 
In the following section, I first address all regressions and results concerning advanced economies, 
beginning with Section 5.1 and continuing through its subsections. Then, I turn to the regressions and results 
concerning emerging economies, beginning with Section 5.2 and continuing through its subsections. 
5.1   Advanced Economies 
Beginning with advanced economies, I am interested first in determining whether the intensity of 
government borrowing affects the likelihood of a banking crisis. A priori, I believe higher levels of 
government debt increase the likelihood of a banking crisis because an over-levered government may be 
incapable of preventing a local, nascent banking crisis from turning into a full-fledged, national one. Then, 
I concern myself with estimating whether macroeconomic variable recession paths differ across type of 
recession. A priori, I hypothesize real macroeconomic outcomes are more severely depressed in banking 
recessions compared to normal recessions (the “across recession” hypothesis) due to additional effects from 
financial market instability. Finally, I quantify the economic costs of heightened, preexisting government 
leverage on real economic outcomes during recessionary periods. A priori, I postulate real macroeconomic 
outcomes are more severely depressed in high debt recessions compared to low debt recessions (the “within 
recession” hypothesis) because high debt levels restrict a government’s access to financial markets and 
consequently its ability to nurse the economy back to health. 
5.1.1   Predicting Banking Crises 
Using the long-run annual dataset for 17 advanced economies, I begin with an empirical analysis 
to understand how the intensity of government leverage affects the likelihood of a banking crisis. These 
regressions provide valuable information about pre-crisis debt dynamics, which may potentially worsen 
subsequent economic recessions. The results are displayed in Table 1.2. 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.2 indicate that both the level of private credit / GDP and the level of 
public debt / GDP do not have a statistically significant individual impact on the likelihood of a banking 
crisis. However, column 3 suggests that when the level of private credit and public debt are both included, 
the level of private credit has a statistically significant, weakly positive impact on the probability of a 
banking crisis (with a coefficient of 0.75). Hence, the higher the level of private credit in an advanced 
economy, the greater the likelihood of a banking crisis. This result squares with existing economic 
literature. The results suggest that the level of public debt / GDP does not impact or increase the likelihood 
of a banking crisis in advanced economies. 
The year-over-year change of private credit / GDP has a strongly positive effect on the likelihood 
of a banking crisis – as seen in columns 4, 6, and 7. When the lagged value of private credit / GDP is 
included and the banking crisis indicator is regressed on only these private credit variables, the results 
become strongly statistically significant (column 4). The coefficient on the demeaned level of private credit 
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/ GDP equals 8.02. Including this lagged value implicitly measures the effect of the year-over-year change 
of this ratio. This result persists with the level and lagged level of public debt / GDP incorporated into the 
regression, column 6. More directly, the final regression specifically regresses the banking crisis indicator 
variable on the year-over-year change of both private credit / GDP and public debt / GDP. The results are 
shown in column 7 and remain consistent with those from column 6; the buildup of private credit has a 
strong, statistically significant, positive influence on the likelihood of a banking crisis in advanced 
economies. The coefficient on the year-over-year change of private credit / GDP equals 8.58. Thus, the 
greater the increase in private credit / GDP from the prior year to the current year, the greater the probability 
of a banking crisis. Notably, neither the level of public debt / GDP nor the buildup of public debt / GDP 
has a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of a banking crisis in advanced economies. 
In advanced economies, the pre-crisis dynamics of private credit – both the level and growth – 
clearly impact the likelihood of a banking crisis. However, the pre-crisis dynamics of government leverage 
do not impact the likelihood of a banking crisis in advanced economies. Nevertheless, the level of 
government debt may still affect the severity of a recession. To this question, I now turn. 
5.1.2   Replication of Results from Jordà et al. (2013) 
I begin my empirical analysis of real outcomes during recessionary periods with a replication of 
the results from Jordà et al. (2013). Effectively replicating the results from a prior study ensures appropriate 
reproduction of the original study’s underlying dataset. Accurate duplication ensures precision of my own 
results, and it allows me to expand upon the work of the original economic researchers. The replication of 
regressions from Jordà et al. (2013) is presented in Table 1.3. The sample for these replication regressions 
duplicates the sample used in their 2013 paper as closely as possible, meaning it is limited to data covering 
only 14 advanced economies from 1870-2007.  
Table 1.3 replicates Table 5 in Jordà et al. (2013) very accurately. Relative to normal recessions in 
advanced economies, banking recessions in advanced economies have more severe economic contractions 
and more persistent output declines. The maximum GDP per capita decline during normal recessions occurs 
in year 1 and equals 2.2%. GDP per capita returns to pre-recession levels by year 2. GDP per capita turns 
strongly positive relative to pre-recession levels by year 3. In banking recessions, the maximum decline in 
GDP per capita equals 3.4%, occurring in year 2. Furthermore, GDP per capita remains 2.5% below pre-
recession levels in year 3 and only returns to pre-recession levels in year 4. Compared to GDP per capita at 
the onset of the recession, year 5 GDP per capita is flat in a banking recession. Thus, real economic 
contractions are more severe (maximum decline of 3.4% compared to 2.2%) and more persistent (recovery 
by year 4 compared to recovery by year 2) in banking recessions compared to normal recessions. 
The results reveal that there is no significant difference between the two recession paths in year 1. 
The per capita output decline is 2.2% in normal recessions and 2.8% in banking recessions, but an F-test 
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cannot reject the null of equality of coefficients. However, the differences between the normal and banking 
recession paths (coefficients) are statistically significant (at the 1% level) in all other times horizons.  The 
difference is about –3.3% in year 2, –4.5% in year 3, –4.1% in year 4, and –4.1% in year 5. These losses 
are quantitatively significant, as well as statistically significant.10 
5.1.3   Recession Paths for Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
Compared to the replication regressions, these regressions use an expanded data set, including all 
17 advanced economies and more recent information – extending from 1870 to 2017. These empirical 
analyses measure how real GDP per capita outcomes differ between normal and banking recessionary 
periods in advanced economies. They also estimate the economic costs of heightened, preexisting 
government leverage during both types of recessionary periods. The regressions quantify how the intensity 
of preexisting government leverage systematically relates to the adversity of a subsequent recessionary 
period. Table 1.4 presents the recession paths of GDP per capita. 
Prior economic studies show that banking recessions have more severe economic contractions and 
more persistent output declines relative to normal recessions in advanced economies. The results in Panel 
A, displayed in Figure 1.1, further support this notion. Banking recessions have a maximum decline in GDP 
per capita of 2.8% compared to a maximum decline in GDP per capita of 2.1% in normal recessions. The 
point estimates of GDP per capita growth relative to pre-recession levels for banking recessions (row 2 
effects) have larger negative magnitudes (or smaller positive magnitudes) than the point estimates of GDP 
per capita growth for normal recessions (row 1 effects). Thus, banking recessions are deeper than normal 
recessions. Furthermore, per capita GDP levels do not recover to pre-recession levels in banking recessions 
until year 4. GDP per capita returns to pre-recession levels by year 2 in normal recessions. Hence, banking 
recessions have more persistent output effects than normal recessions. Generally, the banking recession 
path coefficients are less than the normal recession path coefficients. These differences are shown by an F-
test to be statistically significant during all 5 years post business cycle peak. In normal recessions, GDP per 
capita is typically down 2.1% in year 1 with a return to pre-recession levels in year 2, trending to about a 
4.7% increase by year 5. In banking recessions, GDP per capita drops 2.7% and 2.8% in years 1 and 2, 
respectively, and is not significantly different from pre-recession levels in year 5.  
The regressions in Panel B of Table 1.4 divide each type of recession – normal and banking – based 
upon the preexisting level of government leverage at the onset of the recession, and the results are graphed 
in Figures 1.2 and 1.3. I classify each country-year into Low, Medium, or High Debt terciles according to 
country-specific tercile ranges. This method accords with the within country debt tercile binning process. 
 
10 Table A.5 illustrates the recession paths estimated with the LP method using (six) controls and country fixed effects. The results 
are consistent with the patterns seen in the earlier estimation. The path of real GDP per capita in normal recessions sits well above 
the path seen in banking recessions, further supporting the findings from the earlier results.  
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It allows me to analyze the effects of government debt within a type of recession (e.g. low debt ´ normal 
versus high debt ́  normal) and across types of recession (e.g. low debt ́  normal versus low debt ́  banking). 
The previously discussed result – banking recessions have more severe economic contractions and 
more persistent output declines relative to normal ones – holds fast when breaking down the recessions by 
preexisting level of government debt. For instance, low debt normal recessions have a maximum decline in 
GDP per capita of 2.0% compared to a maximum decline in GDP per capita of 3.1% in low debt banking 
recessions. The point estimates of GDP per capita growth relative to pre-recession levels for low debt 
banking recessions (row 4 effects) have larger negative magnitudes (or smaller positive magnitudes) than 
the point estimates of GDP per capita growth for low debt normal recessions (row 1 effects). Furthermore, 
per capita GDP levels do not recover to pre-recession levels in low debt banking recessions until year 3. 
GDP per capita returns to pre-recession levels by year 2 in low debt normal recessions. This story remains 
valid when comparing across recession types associated with the medium and high terciles of public 
leverage. Generally, banking recession paths – no matter the preexisting level of public debt – are always 
below normal recession paths. The majority (10/15) of these differences are shown to be statistically 
significant by F-tests evaluating the equality of coefficients within the same debt tercile, i.e. low debt 
normal recession point estimate versus low debt banking recession point estimate. Even at more granular 
debt levels, banking recessions are more painful than normal recessions in advanced economies. 
Examining the effect of public leverage within a recession type yields illuminating insights. Within 
advanced economy normal recessions, low preexisting levels of debt experience stronger and faster 
recoveries compared to the medium and high debt terciles, becoming particularly apparent in years 3 
through 5. Low debt normal recessions have a maximum decline in GDP per capita of 2.0% while medium 
debt and high debt normal recessions have a maximum decline in GDP per capita of 2.2% and 1.9%, 
respectively. By year 5, per capita GDP grows 6.3% in low debt normal recessions and only grows 3.9% 
and 4.2% in medium and high debt normal recessions, respectively. Furthermore, per capita GDP levels do 
not recover to pre-recession levels in medium and high debt normal recessions until year 2, on average. Per 
capita GDP exceeds pre-recession levels by year 2 in low debt normal recessions. The low debt normal 
recession path coefficients are typically greater than the medium and high debt normal recession path 
coefficients. The majority (6/10) of these differences are shown to be statistically significant by F-tests 
evaluating the equality of coefficients across debt terciles. These differences could potentially be due to 
government expenditures. Theoretically, governments with lower debt levels may engage in more drastic 
deficit-financed fiscal stimulus during a recession. This mechanism is explored later.  
Within advanced economy banking recessions, there do not exist notable differences in the 
recession path coefficients across leverage terciles. The F-tests evaluating the equality of the low debt point 
estimates against the medium and high debt point estimates never breach statistical significance. 
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Nevertheless, the banking recession paths for all three debt terciles demonstrate sharp and persistent 
declines in per capita GDP (row 4, row 5, and row 6 effects) over time (years 1–5). 
5.1.4   Robustness Checks 
For robustness purposes, I execute additional regressions utilizing an identical econometric 
specification with the debt tercile binning process completed using the across country, as opposed to the 
within country, method. As a reminder, the within country terciling method classifies country-years based 
upon tercile ranges calculated using historical public debt / GDP ratios within each country. The across 
country method classifies country-years using tercile ranges calculated from the debt levels during recession 
years only. The results from these regressions are shown in Table A.6. Although this is a less than perfect 
binning process, the results from these regressions strongly agree with the findings discussed above.  
Another series of robustness regressions control for the level of government leverage continuously 
as follows. As explanatory variables, I use indicator variables for each type of recession (N, B) to capture 
an average treatment response. I also include interactions of these indicators with demeaned public debt / 
GDP levels to capture the marginal treatment responses due to deviations of public debt from is specific 
country mean. In normal recessions, the variable is defined as (N ´ (𝜓 – 𝜓mean)) and in banking recessions 
as (B ´ (𝜓 – 𝜓mean)). Thus, the econometric specification is as follows: 
Δhyi,t+h = qN N + qB B + qN,P (N ´ (𝜓 – 𝜓mean)) + qB,P (B ´ (𝜓 – 𝜓mean)) + ui,t;  i = 1,…,17; h = 1,…,5 
The results from these regressions are shown in Table A.7 and do not produce any insightful findings. 
Analyzing government debt as a continuous treatment enforces a linear relationship between per capita 
GDP growth and public debt. Yet, there seems to exist a nonlinear relationship between preexisting 
government leverage levels and GDP per capita. The debt tercile binning process permits this nonparametric 
relationship between per capita GDP and public debt. Thus, tercile binning is the more appropriate 
technique for my setting; I will use this exclusively throughout the remainder of this section. 
Furthermore, I rerun each set of regressions – the series using the within country method of debt 
binning and the set using the across country method of debt binning – with country fixed effects. The results 
from the country fixed effects regression using the within country method of debt tercile binning are shown 
in Table A.8. The results from the country fixed effects regression using the across country method of debt 
binning are shown in Table A.9. The results from these regressions strongly agree with the findings 
discussed above. 
5.1.5   Recession Paths for Government Expenditures 
These empirical analyses measure how government expenditures differ between normal and 
banking recessionary periods in advanced economies. They also estimate the effect of heightened, 
preexisting government leverage on government spending during both types of recessionary periods. The 
regressions quantify how the intensity of preexisting government leverage systematically relates to 
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government expenditures during a subsequent recessionary period. Table 1.5 presents the recession paths 
of government expenditures. 
The results in Panel A, displayed in Figure 1.4, indicate banking recessions prompt less expansive 
public spending responses relative to normal recessions. The banking recession government spending path 
is always below the normal recession government spending path. These differences are shown by an F-test 
to be statistically significant during years 2 through 5. In normal recessions, public expenditures are 
typically up 6.6% in year 1 and 13.0% in year 2, rising about 35% by year 5. In banking recessions, 
government spending rises 4.8% and 8.4% in years 1 and 2, rising about 18% by year 5.  
The regressions in Panel B of Table 1.5 divide each type of recession – normal and banking – based 
upon the preexisting level of government leverage at the onset of the recession, and the results are graphed 
in Figures 1.5 and 1.6. I classify each country-year into Low Debt, Medium Debt, or High Debt terciles 
according to country-specific tercile ranges. 
When breaking down recessions by preexisting level of government debt, the previously discussed 
result – banking recessions prompt less expansive public spending responses relative to normal recessions 
– is clearly driven by low debt recessions. Specifically, low debt normal recessions experience a statistically 
stronger fiscal response than low debt banking recessions in years 2 through 5. In low debt normal 
recessions, public expenditures are typically up 10.6% in year 1 and 22.0% in year 2, rising by about 59% 
in year 5. In low debt banking recessions, government spending rises 8.0% and 7.8% in years 1 and 2 and 
rises by about 19% in year 5. However, none of the other F-tests evaluating the equality of same debt tercile 
coefficients (row 2 versus row 5 effects and row 3 versus row 6 effects) breach statistical significance. 
Although low debt normal recessions have a statistically stronger fiscal response than low debt banking 
recessions, the underlying drivers of this result are unclear. I believe that low debt recessions show this 
relationship due to a particular and pervasive mindset. Before and during the 1930s, advanced economy 
governments often practiced fiscal austerity. This was most evident during the early years of the Great 
Depression when advanced economy governments reigned in fiscal and monetary policy. Though the Great 
Depression altered policymakers’ viewpoints about fiscal stimulus, the years preceding this global 
catastrophe were marked by fiscal responsibility. Hence, I hypothesize the point estimates in the low debt 
banking crisis category (row 4 effects) are artificially low. This is unconfirmed and a potential path for 
future research. In totality, the more granular debt regressions show the low tercile recessions drive the 
broader result that normal recessions have stronger fiscal spending responses than banking recessions. 
Examining the effect of public leverage within a recession type yields illuminating insights. Within 
advanced economy normal recessions, low preexisting levels of debt allow for stronger public expenditure 
responses compared to medium and high debt terciles. Low debt normal recessions have an average year 1 
rise in public spending of 10.6% while medium debt and high debt normal recessions have an average year 
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1 rise of 4.9% and 3.8%, respectively. By year 5, government expenditures grow from pre-recession levels 
by ~59% in low debt recessions and only grow by ~28% and ~20% in medium and high debt recessions, 
respectively. The point estimates of public spending growth relative to pre-recession levels for low debt 
normal recessions (row 1 effects) have larger positive magnitudes than the point estimates for medium and 
high debt normal recessions (row 2 and row 3 effects, respectively). All (10/10) of these differences are 
shown to be statistically significant by F-tests evaluating the equality of coefficients across debt terciles.  
These results suggest government spending as the explanation of stronger and faster per capita GDP 
growth in low debt normal recessions compared to medium and high debt normal recessions. In other words, 
fiscal stimulus explains why the point estimates of GDP per capita growth for low debt normal recessions 
are larger and more positive than the point estimates of GDP per capita growth for medium and high debt 
normal recessions. Government expenditures are higher during low debt normal recessions than medium 
and high debt normal recessions, and GDP per capita outcomes are also more positive (or less negative) 
during low debt normal recessions than medium and high debt normal recessions. Almost invariably, 
increases in public spending are deficit-financed, especially during recessions (when raising taxes is 
unfeasible and counterproductive). This confirms my expectation that larger leverage loads impede a 
government’s ability to borrow and stimulate economic recovery. Thus, it behooves advanced economy 
governments to moderate their debt burden during non-recessionary periods. 
Within banking recessions, there do not exist noticeable differences in public expenditure point 
estimates across leverage terciles. The F-tests evaluating the equality of the low debt point estimates with 
the medium and high debt point estimates do not breach statistical significance in all but one year. 
Nevertheless, the recession paths for all three debt terciles demonstrate increases in government 
expenditures (row 4, row 5, and row 6 effects) over time (year 1–5).11 
5.1.6   Recession Paths for Investment 
These empirical analyses measure how real investment per capita differs between normal and 
banking recessionary periods in advanced economies. They also estimate the effect of heightened, 
preexisting government leverage on real investment per capita during both types of recessionary periods. 
The regressions quantify how the intensity of preexisting government leverage systematically relates to real 
per capita investment during a subsequent recessionary period. Table 1.6 presents the recession paths of 
real investment per capita. 
Prior economic studies show that banking recessions have more severe and more persistent 
investment contractions relative to normal recessions. The results in Panel A, displayed in Figure 1.7, 
 
11 For robustness purposes, I execute additional regressions using an identical econometric specification with country fixed effects. 
The results from these regressions are shown in Table A.11 and strongly agree with the findings discussed above. 
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further support this notion. Banking recessions have a maximum decline in investment per capita of 17.5% 
compared to a maximum decline in investment per capita of 3.5% in normal recessions. The point estimates 
of investment per capita growth relative to pre-recession levels for banking recessions (row 2 effects) have 
larger negative magnitudes than the point estimates of investment per capita growth for normal recessions 
(row 1 effects). Thus, banking recessions have deeper investment declines than normal recessions. 
Furthermore, per capita investment levels during a banking recession do not ever recover to pre-recession 
levels during the 5 years post business cycle peak. Investment per capita returns to pre-recession levels by 
year 2 in normal recessions. Hence, banking recessions cause more persistent declines in real investment 
per capita than normal recessions. Finally, the banking recession path coefficients are always less than the 
normal recession path coefficients. In normal recessions, investment per capita typically falls 3.5% in year 
1 but returns to pre-recession levels by year 2, growing by about 4% in year 5. In a banking recession, 
investment per capita drops 8.2% and 14.7% in years 1 and 2 and remains depressed by about 14% in year 
5. These differences are shown by an F-test to be statistically significant during all 5 years post-peak. 
The regressions in Panel B of Table 1.6 divide each type of recession – normal and banking – based 
upon the preexisting level of government leverage at the onset of the recession, and the results are graphed 
in Figures 1.8 and 1.9. I classify each country-year into Low, Medium, or High Debt terciles according to 
country-specific tercile ranges. 
The previously discussed result – banking recessions have more severe and more persistent 
investment contractions relative to normal ones – holds fast when breaking down the recessions by 
preexisting level of government debt. For instance, low debt normal recessions have a maximum decline in 
investment per capita of 4.5% compared to a maximum decline in investment per capita of 31% in low debt 
banking recessions. Furthermore, per capita investment levels do not ever recover to pre-recession levels 
in low debt banking recessions during the post-peak 5-year period. Investment per capita returns to pre-
recession levels by year 2 in low debt normal recessions. This story remains valid when comparing across 
recession types associated with the medium and high terciles of public leverage. Generally, banking 
recession paths – no matter the preexisting level of public debt – are always below normal recession paths. 
The majority (14/15) of these differences are shown to be statistically significant by F-tests evaluating the 
equality of coefficients within the same debt tercile. Even at more granular debt levels, banking recessions 
have more painful investment outcomes than normal recessions in advanced economies.  
Examining the effect of public leverage within a recession type yields illuminating insights. Within 
advanced economy normal recessions, low preexisting levels of debt facilitate worse and slower recoveries 
of investment compared to the high debt tercile, becoming particularly apparent in years 2 through 5. Low 
debt normal recessions have a maximum decline in investment per capita of 4.5% while high debt normal 
recessions have a maximum decline in investment per capita of 1.4%. By year 5, per capita investment 
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grows only 4.8% in low debt normal recessions but expands by 10% in high debt normal recessions. 
Furthermore, per capita investment levels do not ever dip below pre-recession levels during high debt 
normal recessions. Whereas per capita investment return to pre-recession levels in year 2 of low debt normal 
recessions. Generally, the low debt normal recession path is below the high debt normal recession path. 
Though this difference is not shown to be statistically significant through F-tests evaluating the equality of 
coefficients, the qualitative differences between the coefficients of different debt terciles demonstrate a 
particular phenomenon: crowding out. 
Crowding out occurs when expansionary fiscal policy – which is often deficit-financed in advanced 
economies – demands loanable funds from the money market. This increases interest rates, therefore 
reducing private investment spending. Most clearly, low debt normal recessions induce the greatest 
increases in government expenditures. Low debt normal recessions also have relatively weak and prolonged 
recoveries in per capita investment spending. Contrastingly, high debt normal recessions induce the weakest 
increases in public spending. However, high debt normal recessions have the strongest and fastest 
recoveries in private investment per capita. These reciprocal results distinguish the crowding out of private 
investment by increased government expenditures. 
Furthermore, these results suggest that public investment (government expenditures) has a greater 
social marginal benefit than private investment in advanced economies. This marginal benefit difference 
explains why GDP per capita growth is stronger and faster in low debt normal recessions compared to 
medium and high debt normal recessions. Investment recovers stronger and faster during high and medium 
debt normal recessions than low ones. While GDP per capita outcomes are more positive (less negative) 
and public expenditure responses are stronger during low debt normal recessions than high and medium 
debt ones. In other words, the effect on economic output of an additional dollar in government expenditures 
far outweighs the effect of an additional dollar of private investment, meaning government expenditures 
are a better stimulant in advanced economies than private investment. Thus, it behooves advanced economy 
governments to moderate their debt burden during non-recessionary periods because public investment 
bears greater economic impact than private investment.12 
5.2   Emerging Economies 
Turning now to emerging economies, I am interested first in determining whether the intensity of 
government borrowing affects the likelihood of a banking crisis. A priori, I believe higher levels of 
government debt increase the likelihood of a banking crisis because an over-levered government may be 
incapable of preventing a local, nascent banking crisis from turning into a full-fledged, national one. Then, 
I concern myself with estimating whether macroeconomic variable recession paths difference across type 
 
12 For robustness purposes, I execute additional regressions using an identical econometric specification with country fixed effects. 
The results from these regressions are shown in Table A.10 and strongly agree with the findings discussed above. 
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of recession. A priori, I hypothesize real macroeconomic outcomes are more severely depressed in banking 
recessions compared to normal recessions (the “across recession” hypothesis) due to additional effects from 
financial market instability. Finally, I quantify the economic costs of heightened, preexisting government 
leverage on real economic outcomes during recessionary periods. A priori, I postulate real macroeconomic 
outcomes are more severely depressed in high debt recessions compared to low debt recessions (the “within 
recession” hypothesis) because high debt levels restrict a government’s access to financial markets and 
consequently its ability to nurse the economy back to health. 
5.2.1   Predicting Banking Crises 
Using the annual dataset for 68 emerging economies, I begin with an empirical analysis to 
understand how the intensity of government leverage affects the likelihood of a banking crisis. These 
regressions provide valuable information about pre-crisis debt dynamics, which may potentially worsen 
subsequent economic recessions. The results are displayed in Table 2.2. 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.2 indicate that both the level of private credit / GDP and the level of 
public debt / GDP have a statistically significant individual impact on the likelihood of a banking crisis in 
emerging economies. Each metric has a positive relationship with the probability of a banking crisis, 
suggesting that higher levels of either private credit / GDP or public debt / GDP increase the likelihood of 
a crisis. Furthermore, column 3 shows that when both the level of private credit and public debt are included 
as explanatory variables, both have a statistically significant, positive impact on the probability of a banking 
crisis (with coefficients of 1.62 and 1.19, respectively). Hence, the higher the level of private credit in an 
emerging economy, the greater the likelihood of a banking crisis. And the higher the level of public debt in 
an emerging economy, the greater the probability of a banking crisis. 
The year-over-year change of public debt / GDP has a strongly positive effect on the likelihood of 
a banking crisis, as seen in columns 5, 6, and 7. When the lagged value of public debt / GDP is included 
and the banking crisis indicator is regressed on only these public debt variables, the results become strongly 
statistically significant (column 5). The coefficient on the demeaned level of public debt / GDP equals 1.79. 
Including this lagged value implicitly measures the effect of the year-over-year change of this ratio. This 
result persists with the level and lagged level of private credit / GDP incorporated into the regression 
(column 6). The coefficient on the demeaned level of public debt / GDP equals 15. More directly, the final 
regression specifically regresses the banking crisis indicator variable on the year-over-year change of both 
private credit / GDP and public debt / GDP. The results are shown in column 7 and remain consistent with 
those from column 6; the buildup of public debt has a statistically significant, positive influence on the 
likelihood of a banking crisis in emerging economies. The coefficient on the year-over-year change of 
public debt / GDP equals 2.03. Thus, the greater the increase in public debt / GDP from the prior year to 
the current year, the greater the probability of a banking crisis. 
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While the growth of private credit does not impact the likelihood of a banking crisis, both the level 
of public debt / GDP and the intensity of public debt / GDP buildup have a statistically significant, positive 
impact on the likelihood of a banking crisis. However, these pre-crisis dynamics concerning government 
debt tell nothing of the effect of public leverage on the severity of a recession. To this question, I now turn. 
5.2.2   Recession Paths for Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
These empirical analyses measure how real GDP per capita outcomes differ between normal and 
banking recessionary periods in emerging economies. They also estimate the economic costs of heightened, 
preexisting government leverage during both types of recessionary periods. The regressions quantify how 
the intensity of preexisting government leverage systematically relates to the adversity of a subsequent 
recessionary period. Table 2.3 presents the recession paths of GDP per capita. 
Prior economic studies show that banking recessions have more severe economic contractions and 
more persistent output declines relative to normal recessions. The results in Panel A, displayed in Figure 
2.1, further support this notion. Banking recessions have a maximum decline in GDP per capita of 5.5% 
compared to a maximum decline in GDP per capita of 3.2% in normal recessions. The point estimates of 
GDP per capita growth relative to pre-recession levels for banking recessions (row 2 effects) have larger 
negative magnitudes than the point estimates of GDP per capita growth for normal recessions (row 1 
effects). Thus, banking recessions are on average deeper than normal ones. Furthermore, per capita GDP 
levels do not recover to pre-recession levels in banking recessions during the 5 years succeeding a business 
cycle peak. GDP per capita returns to pre-recession levels by year 5 in normal recessions. Hence, banking 
recessions have more persistent real output effects than normal recessions in emerging economies. In 
normal recessions, GDP per capita is typically down 3.2% in year 1 and 3.1% in year 2, returning to pre-
recession levels by year 5. In banking recessions, GDP per capita drops 4.5% and 5.5% in years 1 and 2 
and remains 3% below prerecession levels in year 5. Generally, the banking recession path is below the 
normal recession path. The differences are shown by an F-test to be statistically significant during all 5 
years post business cycle peak. 
The regressions in Panel B of Table 2.3 divide each type of recession – normal and banking – based 
upon the preexisting level of government leverage at the onset of the recession, and the results are graphed 
in Figures 2.2 and 2.3. I classify each country-year into Low, Medium, or High Debt terciles according to 
country-specific tercile ranges. 
When breaking down the recessions by preexisting level of government debt, the previously 
discussed result – banking recessions have more severe economic contractions and more persistent output 
declines relative to normal ones – is clearly driven by low debt recessions. Specifically, low debt banking 
recessions have a statistically harsher decline in real GDP per capita than low debt normal recessions in 
years 2 through 4. In low debt normal recessions, per capita GDP is typically down 3.5% in year 1 and 
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2.8% in year 2, trending to about a 1% decline in year 5. In low debt banking recessions, GDP per capita 
falls by 4.8% and 8.0% in years 1 and 2, trending to about a 5% decrease by year 5. However, none of the 
other F-tests evaluating the equality of same debt tercile coefficients (row 2 effects versus row 5 effects 
and row 3 effects versus row 6 effects) breach statistical significance. Although only the low debt recession 
paths provide evidence in favor of the prior conclusion that banking recessions have more severe and 
persistent economic contractions than normal ones, I remain confident in the validity of this previous 
conclusion as there is often statistical noise in emerging economy macroeconomic data.  
Examining the effect of public leverage within a recession type yields illuminating insights. Within 
emerging economy banking recessions, low preexisting levels of debt facilitate drastically weaker 
recoveries compared to the medium debt tercile, particularly apparent in years 1 through 4. Low debt 
banking recessions have a maximum decline in GDP per capita of 8.0% while medium debt banking 
recessions have a maximum decline in GDP per capita of 2.6%. By year 5, per capita GDP remains 
depressed by 4% in low debt banking recessions and only remains depressed by 2.4% in medium debt 
banking recessions. The point estimates of GDP per capita growth relative to pre-recession levels for low 
debt banking recessions (row 4 effects) have larger negative magnitudes than the point estimates for 
medium debt banking recessions (row 5 effects). The majority (3/5) of these differences are shown to be 
statistically significant by F-tests evaluating the equality of coefficients across debt terciles. 
Within emerging economy normal recessions, there do not exist noticeable differences in GDP per 
capita point estimates across leverage terciles. The F-tests evaluating the equality of the low debt point 
estimates with medium and high debt point estimates do not breach statistical significance. Nevertheless, 
the recession paths for all three debt terciles demonstrate declines in per capita GDP (row 3, row 4, and row 
5 effects) over time, with the smallest magnitude declines occurring in low debt normal recessions. 
5.2.3   Robustness Checks 
For robustness purposes, I execute additional regressions utilizing an identical econometric 
specification with the debt tercile binning process completed using the across country, as opposed to the 
within country, method. The results from these regressions are shown in Table A.12. Although this is a less 
than perfect binning method, the results from these regressions agree with the findings discussed above.  
Another series of robustness regressions control for the level of government leverage continuously 
as follows. As explanatory variables, I use indicator variables for each type of recession (N, B) to capture 
an average treatment response. I also include interactions of these indicators with demeaned public debt / 
GDP levels to capture the marginal treatment responses due to deviations of public debt from is specific 
country mean. In normal recessions, the variable is defined as (N ´ (𝜓 – 𝜓mean)) and in banking recessions 
as (B ´ (𝜓 – 𝜓mean)). Thus, the econometric specification is as follows: 
Δhyi,t+h = qN N + qB B + qN,P (N ´ (𝜓 – 𝜓mean)) + qB,P (B ´ (𝜓 – 𝜓mean)) + ui,t;  i = 1,…,68; h = 1,…,5 
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The results from these regressions are shown in Table A.13 and do not produce any insightful findings. 
Analyzing government debt as a continuous treatment enforces a linear relationship between per capita 
GDP and public debt. Yet, there seems to exist a nonlinear relationship between preexisting government 
leverage levels and GDP per capita. The debt tercile binning process permits this nonparametric relationship 
between per capita GDP and public debt. Thus, tercile binning is the more appropriate technique for my 
setting; I will use this exclusively throughout the remainder of this section. 
Furthermore, I rerun each set of regressions – the set using the within country method of debt 
binning and the set using the across country method of debt binning – with country fixed effects. The results 
from the country fixed effects regression using the within country method of debt tercile binning are shown 
in Table A.14. The results from the country fixed effects regression using the across country method of 
debt binning are shown in Table A.15. The results from these regressions strongly agree with the findings 
discussed above. 
5.2.4   Recession Paths for Government Expenditures 
These empirical analyses measure how government expenditures differ between normal and 
banking recessionary periods in emerging economies. They also estimate the effect of heightened, 
preexisting government leverage on government spending during both types of recessionary periods. The 
regressions quantify how the intensity of preexisting government leverage systematically relates to 
government expenditures during a subsequent recessionary period. Table 2.4 presents the recession paths 
of government expenditures. 
The results in Panel A, displayed in Figure 2.4, show no statistically significant differences in 
public expenditure response between normal and banking recessions. In normal recessions, public 
expenditures are typically up 2.1% in year 1 and 5.3% in year 2, trending to about a 15% rise by year 5. In 
a banking recession, government spending rises 1.5% and 4.6% in years 1 and 2, trending to about a 9% 
rise by year 5. The F-tests evaluating the equality of the normal point estimates with the banking point 
estimates do not breach statistical significance in any regression. Nevertheless, the government spending 
recession path coefficients for both types of recessions are themselves statistically different from zero and 
quantitatively large. This suggests that in both types of recessions, emerging economy governments respond 
to recessions with increases in government expenditures (row 1 and row 2 effects). 
The regressions in Panel B of Table 2.4 divide each type of recession – normal and banking – based 
upon the preexisting level of government leverage at the onset of the recession, and the results are graphed 
in Figures 2.5 and 2.6. I classify each country-year into Low, Medium, or High Debt terciles according to 
country-specific tercile ranges. 
The previously discussed result – banking recessions prompt no different of a response in public 
spending relative to normal recessions – is strongly supported when breaking down recessions by 
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preexisting level of government debt. A majority (11/15) of the F-tests evaluating the equality of same debt 
tercile treatment coefficients (row 1 versus row 4 effects, row 2 versus row 5 effects, and row 3 versus row 
6 effects) do not breach statistical significance. 
Examining the effect of public leverage within a recession type yields illuminating insights. Within 
normal recessions, low preexisting levels of debt facilitate stronger public expenditure responses compared 
to the medium and high debt terciles. Low debt normal recessions have an average year 1 rise in public 
spending of 4.5% while medium debt and high debt normal recessions have an average year 1 rise of 0.9% 
and fall of 0.6%, respectively. By year 5, government expenditures grow from pre-recession levels by ~26% 
in low debt recessions and only grow by ~7% and ~6% in medium and high debt recessions, respectively. 
The point estimates of public spending growth relative to pre-recession levels for low debt normal 
recessions (row 1 effects) have larger positive magnitudes than the point estimates for medium and high 
debt normal recessions (row 2 and row 3 effects, respectively). All (10/10) of these differences are shown 
to be statistically significant by F-tests evaluating the equality of coefficients across debt terciles. These 
results are slightly counterintuitive as greater fiscal stimulus is typically considered an economic stimulant, 
improving per capita GDP growth. Nevertheless, there do not exist noticeable differences between GDP 
per capita point estimates across normal recession debt terciles. Thus, the stronger fiscal response during 
low debt normal recessions compared to medium and high debt normal recessions does not translate into 
real output effects during these recessions for emerging economies. 
Within banking recessions, low preexisting levels of debt facilitate stronger public expenditure 
responses compared to the high debt tercile. Low debt banking recessions have an average year 1 rise in 
public spending of 6.9% while high debt banking recessions have an average year 1 decline of 3.2%. By 
year 5, government expenditures grow from pre-recession levels by ~25% in low debt banking recessions 
and decline by ~8% in high debt banking recessions. The point estimates of public expenditure growth 
relative to pre-recession levels for low debt banking recessions (row 4 effects) have larger positive 
magnitudes than the point estimates for high debt banking recessions (row 6 effects). All (5/5) these 
differences are statistically significant by F-tests evaluating the equality of coefficients across debt terciles.  
These results do not provide a clear explanation of weaker GDP per capita growth in low debt 
banking recessions compared to medium and high debt ones. Fiscal stimulus – or a lack thereof – does not 
account for the more negative point estimates of GDP per capita growth associated with low debt banking 
recessions compared to the point estimates for medium and high debt banking recessions. High debt levels 
– especially for an emerging economy – may be indicative of other economic weaknesses and increased 
risk. These external factors impede a government’s ability to support the national economy through deficit-
financed fiscal stimulus. As expected, government expenditures in emerging economies are higher during 
low debt banking recessions than during medium and high debt banking recessions. However, GDP per 
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capita outcomes are more negative during these low debt banking recessions than during medium and high 
debt banking recessions. These GDP results suggest government expenditures should be lower during low 
debt banking recessions than during medium and high debt banking recessions if fiscal stimulus is the 
explanation driving GDP outcomes. However, this is clearly not the case. These results contradict my 
expectation that higher leverage levels impede a government’s ability to stimulate economic recovery. 
Thus, emerging economy governments need not be unduly concerned with public debt burdens during non-
recessionary periods.13 
5.2.5   Recession Paths for Investment 
These empirical analyses measure how real investment per capita differs between normal and 
banking recessionary periods in emerging economies. They also estimate the effect of heightened, 
preexisting government leverage on real investment per capita during both types of recessionary periods. 
The regressions quantify how the intensity of preexisting government leverage systematically relates to real 
per capita investment during a subsequent recessionary period. Table 2.5 presents the recession paths of 
real investment per capita. 
The results in Panel A, displayed in Figure 2.7, show banking recessions have more severe and 
more persistent investment contractions relative to normal recessions. Banking recessions have a maximum 
decline in investment per capita of 21.3% compared to a maximum decline in investment per capita of 6.9% 
in normal recessions. The point estimates of investment per capita growth relative to pre-recession levels 
for banking recessions (row 2 effects) have larger negative magnitudes than the point estimates for normal 
recessions (row 1 effects). Thus, banking recessions have deeper investment contractions than normal 
recessions. Furthermore, per capita investment levels during banking recessions do not recover to pre-
recession levels during the 5 years post business cycle peak. Investment per capita returns to pre-recession 
levels by year 5 in normal recessions. Hence, banking recessions cause more persistent declines in real 
investment per capita than normal recessions. Generally, the banking recession path is always below the 
normal recession path. This difference is shown by F-tests to be statistically significant during the first 3 
years post business cycle peak. In normal recessions, investment per capita falls typically 6.9% in year 1 
and 6.8% in year 2, trending to about a 3% decline by year 5. In banking recessions, investment per capita 
drops 17.1% and 21.3% in years 1 and 2 and remains depressed by about 13% in year 5.  
The regressions in Panel B of Table 2.5 divide each type of recession – normal and banking – based 
upon the preexisting level of government leverage at the onset of the recession, and the results are graphed 
 
13 For robustness purposes, I execute additional regressions using an identical econometric specification with country fixed effects. 
The results from these regressions are shown in Table A.17 and strongly agree with the findings discussed above. 
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in Figures 2.8 and 2.9. I classify each country-year into Low, Medium, or High Debt terciles according to 
country-specific tercile ranges.  
Breaking down recessions by preexisting level of government debt complicates the previously 
discussed result – banking recessions have more severe and more persistent investment contractions relative 
to normal recessions. Specifically, low debt recessions drive this broader result. Low debt normal recessions 
have a statistically stronger and faster recovery in investment than low debt banking recessions in all 5 
years post business cycle peak. In low debt normal recessions, investment per capita is typically down 5.7% 
in year 1 and 4.3% in year 2, trending to about a 3.5% fall by year 5. Though, the coefficients in years 3 
through 5 are not statistically different from zero. In a low debt banking recession, investment per capita 
falls 17.5% and 37.0% in years 1 and 2, trending to about a 37% fall by year 5. These declines in investment 
per capita are all statistically different from zero. However, none of the other F-tests evaluating the equality 
of same debt tercile coefficients (row 2 versus row 5 effects and row 3 versus row 6 effects) breach statistical 
significance. 
Examining the effect of public leverage within a recession type yields illuminating insights. Within 
banking recessions, low preexisting levels of debt facilitate worse and slower recoveries of investment 
compared to the medium and high debt terciles, particularly apparent in years 2 through 5. Low debt 
banking recessions have a maximum decline in investment per capita of 39.4% while medium debt and 
high debt banking recessions have a maximum decline in investment per capita of 14.3% and 20.7%, 
respectively. By year 5, per capita investment falls ~37% in low debt banking recessions but falls by only 
~11% in medium debt banking recessions and actually expands by 6.2% in high debt banking recessions. 
Furthermore, per capita investment levels recover to pre-recession levels in both medium and high debt 
banking recessions by year 2. Whereas per capita investment never exceeds pre-recession levels in low debt 
banking recessions. Generally, the low debt banking recession path is below the medium and high debt 
banking recession paths. A majority (7/10) of these differences are shown to be statistically significant by 
F-tests evaluating the equality of coefficients. These quantitative differences between the coefficients of 
different debt tercile interaction terms demonstrate a particular phenomenon: crowding out.  
Expansionary fiscal policy – which is often deficit-financed during a recessionary period due to the 
collapse of tax revenues – demands loanable funds from the money market. This increases interest rates, 
therefore reducing private investment spending. Low debt banking recessions induce the greatest increases 
in government expenditures. Low debt banking recessions also have relatively weak and prolonged 
recoveries in per capita investment spending. Contrastingly, high debt banking recessions induce the 
weakest increases in public spending. High debt banking recessions also have the strongest and fastest 
recoveries in investment per capita. These reciprocal results distinguish the crowding out of private 
investment by increased government expenditures. 
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Furthermore, these results illuminate an explanation for weaker and lower per capita GDP growth 
during low debt banking recessions compared to medium and high debt banking recessions. Concisely, 
private investment has a greater social marginal benefit than public investment (government expenditures) 
in emerging economies. Investment recovers stronger and faster during high and medium debt banking 
recessions than low ones, and GDP per capita outcomes are also more positive (less negative) during high 
and medium debt banking recessions than low debt ones. In other words, the effect on economic output of 
an additional dollar in private investment expenditures outweighs the effect of an additional dollar of 
government expenditures, meaning private investment is a better stimulant in emerging economies. Thus, 
emerging economy governments need not be unduly concerned with public debt burdens during non-
recessionary periods because private investment bears a greater economic impact.14 
Section 6:  Discussion 
The following section summarizes the results and compares advanced economies with emerging 
economies. It attempts to illuminate and explain intriguing differences between advanced economies and 
their emerging counterparts. 
Both the advanced economy regressions and emerging economy regressions confirm that banking 
recessions are associated with more severe economic contractions and more persistent output declines than 
normal recessions, confirming the across recession hypothesis. Partitioning by public debt terciles proves 
informative. In advanced economies, low debt normal recessions have stronger and faster GDP recoveries 
compared to medium and high debt normal recessions. This result aligns with the within recession 
hypothesis. Contradicting this hypothesis, low debt banking recessions experience weaker and slower 
investment recoveries compared to medium and high debt banking recessions in emerging economies. 
The advanced economy regressions indicate banking recessions prompt less expansive public 
spending responses relative to normal recessions, while the emerging economy regressions show banking 
recessions prompt no different a public spending response relative to normal recessions. This difference is 
reconciled by the stability differences between emerging and advanced economies. International 
organizations (including banks and supranational entities like the IMF and World Bank) and other nations 
may not be inclined to lend funds to an emerging economy during a recession – regardless of its public debt 
level – for fear of default. Creditors view emerging economies as high-risk borrowers and may not be 
willing to extend credit. Partitioning by public debt terciles again proves informative. In advanced 
economies, low debt normal recessions have stronger public expenditure responses compared to medium 
and high debt normal recessions. This result makes intuitive sense and suggests fiscal stimulus as the driver 
 
14 For robustness purposes, I execute additional regressions using an identical econometric specification with country fixed effects. 
The results from these regressions are shown in Table A.16 and strongly agree with the findings discussed above. 
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of stronger and faster per capita GDP growth in low debt normal recessions compared to medium and high 
debt normal recessions. In emerging economies, low debt recessions (both normal and banking) facilitate 
stronger public expenditure responses compared to medium and high debt recessions. This result is 
counterintuitive because GDP per capita outcomes are more negative during these low debt recessions than 
during medium and high debt recessions. Thus, the stronger fiscal response during low debt recessions must 
not translate into real output effects for emerging economies.  
Both the advanced economy and emerging economy regressions verify that banking recessions 
have more severe and more persistent investment contractions relative to normal recessions, confirming the 
across recession hypothesis. Partitioning by public debt terciles reveals that advanced economies, low debt 
recessions (both normal and banking) experience deeper investment contractions and slower investment 
recoveries compared to medium and high debt recessions. Similarly in emerging economies, low debt 
banking recessions experience weaker and slower investment recoveries compared to medium and high 
debt ones. Overall, these results contradict the within recession hypothesis: macroeconomic outcomes (like 
investment) contract more severely in high debt recessions compared to low debt recessions. 
These results illustrate two contrasting stories: one for advanced economies and another for 
emerging economies. These converse narratives are likely driven by systematic differences between 
advanced and emerging economies and their substructures. 
First, advanced economies. These results suggest that public investment (government expenditures) 
has a greater social marginal benefit than private investment in advanced economies. In other words, the 
effect on economic output of an additional dollar in government expenditures outweighs the effect of an 
additional dollar of private investment, meaning government expenditures are a better stimulant in 
advanced economies than private investment. It is important to note that social welfare is challenging to 
observe directly. However, GDP is a good proxy. Examining the narrow, within recession results illustrates 
this. Low debt normal recessions experience stronger and faster GDP recoveries compared to medium and 
high debt normal recessions in advanced economies. Simultaneously, low debt normal recessions 
experience stronger public expenditure responses compared to medium and high debt ones while low debt 
recessions experience worse investment outcomes compared to medium and high debt ones. Painting a 
clearer picture, GDP recovers quickly and strongly with expansionary and supportive fiscal policy during 
low debt normal recessions, even with depressed private investment. Thus, the gains from increased 
government spending exceed the losses from depressed investment spending. Opposingly, GDP recovers 
slowly and weakly with less expansionary fiscal policy during high debt normal recessions, even with 
strong private investment. Hence, the social marginal benefit of strong private investment does not 
compensate for the social marginal benefit lost due to depressed government expenditures during high debt 
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normal recessions. Thus, government expenditures appear to have a greater social marginal benefit than 
private investment, explaining the GDP recession path patterns we observe in advanced economies.  
Although this marginal benefit discrepancy does not arise explicitly in advanced economy banking 
recessions, the results lend it support. Looking to the results, there do not exist notable differences in the 
GDP recession path coefficients across leverage terciles. Similarly, there do not exist notable differences 
in the public expenditure recession path coefficients across leverage terciles. However, low debt recessions 
have deeper investment contractions and slower investment recoveries compared to medium and high debt 
recessions. If the social marginal benefit of private investment exceeds that of government expenditures, 
we should see differences in the GDP point estimates across debt terciles. We do not. If the social marginal 
benefit of government expenditures exceeds that of private investment, the GDP recession path coefficients 
should be weak across all debt terciles equally. This is the case. Overall, the results suggest a marginal 
benefit disparity between government expenditures and private investment in advanced economies, with 
government expenditures wielding greater influence. 
Now, emerging economies. The results indicate that private investment has a greater social 
marginal benefit than government expenditures in emerging economies. In other words, the effect on 
economic output of an additional dollar spent in private investment outweighs the effect of an additional 
dollar of public investment expenditures, meaning private investment is a better stimulant in emerging 
economies than government expenditures. Examining the narrow, within recession results illustrates this. 
Low debt banking recessions experience weaker and slower GDP recoveries compared to medium and high 
debt banking recessions in emerging economies. Simultaneously, low debt recessions experience stronger 
public expenditure responses compared to medium and high debt ones while low debt banking recessions 
experience weaker investment outcomes compared to medium and high debt ones. Painting a clearer 
picture, GDP recovers slowly and weakly with depressed private investment during low debt banking 
recessions, even with expansionary and supportive fiscal policy. Hence, the social marginal benefit of 
increased government spending does not compensate for the social marginal benefit lost due to depressed 
private investment during low debt banking recessions. Opposingly, GDP recovers quickly and strongly 
with strong private investment during high debt banking recessions, even with weak fiscal spending. The 
gains from increased private investment exceed the losses from tepid government spending. Thus, private 
investment appears to have a greater social marginal benefit than government expenditures, explaining the 
GDP per capita recession path patterns we observe in emerging economies. 
To summarize, the results suggest that the social marginal benefit of public sector investment 
exceeds the social marginal benefit of private sector investment in advanced economies, while the social 
marginal benefit of private sector investment exceeds the social marginal benefit of public sector investment 
in emerging economies. 
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Section 7:  Conclusion 
This thesis dissects the relationships between government leverage and various macroeconomic 
aggregates, including GDP per capita, private investment per capita, and government expenditures. I end 
with two interconnected conclusions: 1) the level of government leverage matters for advanced economies 
but not emerging economies, and 2) government expenditures have a greater social marginal benefit than 
private investment spending in advanced economies while the reverse is true in emerging economies. 
In advanced economy normal recessions, low preexisting government debt levels correspond with 
stronger and faster recoveries in GDP. This result is driven by expansionary and supportive fiscal policy. 
High preexisting government debt levels correspond with weaker and slower recoveries in GDP and are 
associated with less expansionary fiscal policy. This relationship is similarly reflected in advanced economy 
banking recessions where both GDP growth and government spending remain equally depressed across all 
debt tercile levels. Overall, larger public leverage loads impede an advanced economy government’s ability 
to borrow and stimulate economic recovery. Thus, it behooves advanced economy governments to moderate 
their debt burden during non-recessionary periods to avoid mortgaging future economic health. 
In emerging economy banking recessions, low debt banking recessions correspond with weaker 
and slower GDP recoveries. However, government expenditures are higher during low debt banking 
recessions. This is similarly reflected in emerging economy normal recessions where low debt recessions 
facilitate stronger public expenditure responses while GDP recession path coefficients do not vary across 
leverage terciles. Overall, economic performance and recovery appear divorced from an emerging economy 
government’s ability to borrow and stimulate economic recovery. 
In advanced economies, GDP recovers quickly and strongly with expansionary and supportive 
fiscal policy during low debt normal recessions, even with depressed private investment. Meanwhile, GDP 
recovers slowly and weakly with less expansionary fiscal policy during high debt normal recessions, even 
with strong private investment. Thus, the social marginal benefit from increased government spending 
exceeds the lost social marginal benefit from depressed private investment in advanced economies. 
In emerging economies, GDP recovers quickly and strongly with strong private investment during 
high debt banking recessions, even with weak fiscal spending. Meanwhile, GDP recovers slowly and 
weakly with depressed private investment during low debt banking recessions, even with expansionary and 
supportive fiscal policy. Thus, the social marginal benefit from increased private investment exceeds the 
lost social marginal benefit from tepid government expenditures in emerging economies. 
The social marginal benefit discrepancy between government expenditures and private investment 
elucidates why advanced economy governments must moderate their debt burdens while emerging 
economy governments may remain unconcerned about their debt burdens. In advanced economies, 
governments must reserve the ability to stimulate the economy through deficit-financed fiscal stimulus 
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because government expenditures are more effective than private investment at nursing an economy 
through a recession. In emerging economies, governments need not reserve the ability to stimulate the 
economy through deficit-financed fiscal stimulus because private investment is more effective than 
government expenditures at nursing an economy through a recession. 
As with all research, there exist pathways for further study. I explore GDP, government 
expenditures, and private investment during recessionary periods only. Future research could examine 
government expenditures and private investment during non-recessionary periods. Additional extension 
work could investigate and attempt to identify the systematic differences between advanced and emerging 
economies driving these underlying marginal benefit differences. A cursory examination of these potential 
systemic differences is suggestive.  
Assume both advanced economies and emerging economies split into two simple sectors – services 
and natural resources. Emerging economies rely more heavily on the exploitation and extraction of natural 
resources to drive GDP growth, while advanced economies rely more heavily on innovation in the services 
sector to drive GDP growth. Although the private marginal benefit may be equivalent across sectors in 
emerging economies, the social marginal benefit of the natural resources sector may exceed that of the 
services sector due to positive externalities not being internalized. For instance, the capital-intensive nature 
of mining and extraction requires skilled operators and effective management techniques often poached 
from advanced economies. Native citizens learn these practices, thus enhancing the underlying human 
capital of these emerging nations. Importantly, corporations involved in resource extraction are often 
nationalized and state-controlled in emerging economies (e.g., Petrobras in Brazil or Saudi Aramco in Saudi 
Arabia). Thus, the majority of investment in the natural resources sector should be captured in government 
expenditures as opposed to private investment. As natural resource exploitation comprises a larger fraction 
of these emerging economies, improved GDP recession paths should correspond with stronger fiscal policy 
responses (associated with greater investment in the natural resources sector). However, the reverse is true; 
GDP recovers slowly and weakly during recessions with expansionary and supportive fiscal policy while 
GDP recovers quickly and strongly with weaker fiscal support. Thus, this proposed systematic difference 
driving social marginal benefit discrepancies – that emerging economies rely more heavily on natural 
resource extraction while advanced economies rely more heavily on the services sector – is not sound.  
Since we know the prior explanation is not valid, now assume both advanced economies and 
emerging economies partition into two simple sectors – manufacturing and services. Although the private 
marginal benefit may be equivalent across sectors in advanced economies, the social marginal benefit of 
the services sector may exceed that of the manufacturing sector due to positive externalities (read: good 
healthcare and good public education) not being internalized. Furthermore, a greater share of government 
expenditures flows to the services sector – e.g., healthcare spending, education spending, and nondefense, 
 41 
discretionary spending – than to the manufacturing sector. Thus, advanced economy governments may 
account for a disproportionate amount of stimulus to the services sector (with a greater social marginal 
benefit), explaining why improved GDP recession paths in advanced economies correspond with stronger 
fiscal policy responses. Similarly, the private marginal benefit may be equivalent across the manufacturing 
and services sectors in emerging economies. However, the social marginal benefit of the manufacturing 
sector may exceed that of the services sector due to positive externalities not being internalized. For 
instance, sharing of intellectual property, manufacturing techniques, management strategies, and other 
knowledge often accompany private investment in emerging economies, enhancing the underlying human 
capital of these emerging nations. As manufacturing comprises a larger fraction of these emerging 
economies, a greater share of private investment flows to the manufacturing sector than the services sector. 
Thus, an outsize amount of private investment to the manufacturing sector (with a greater social marginal 
benefit) explains why better GDP recession paths in emerging economies correspond with stronger 
investment responses. A closer study of the positive externalities in advanced and emerging economies may 
explain the social marginal benefit discrepancies between government expenditures and private investment 
found in this thesis.  
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Section 8:  Regression Tables and Figures 
This section contains all regression tables to which I refer in the main body of the thesis. 
8.1   Advanced Economy Tables and Figures 
This section contains all advanced economy regression tables to which I refer in the body of the thesis. 
 
TABLE 1.1
Advanced Economy Summary Statistics
All Country Years All Recession Peaks Normal Recession Peaks Banking Recession Peaks
N = 2,516 371 279 92
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Real GDP per capita (index, 2005=100) 38.32 32.57 30.38 30.41 29.72 28.54 32.38 35.57
Real GDP (1990 USD$, in millions) 3,880,000 10,500,000 2,930,000 8,790,000 2,900,000 8,140,000 3,040,000 10,600,000
Real Investment per capita (index) 8.70 8.13 6.87 8.14 6.59 7.62 7.75 9.58
General Government Debt to GDP ratio (%) 54.4 39.2 52.0 37.1 52.7 38.7 49.7 31.7
Private, Non-Financial Sector Credit to GDP ratio (%) 57.6 36.1 52.7 38.1 50.1 34.8 60.4 45.8
Banking Crisis Indicator 0.036 0.186 0.248 0.246 0 0 1 0
Government Expenditures (nominal, local currency) 528,667 3,203,034 297,108 2,088,448 175,488 1,099,056 657,867 3,696,001
Government Revenue (nominal, local currency) 461,408 2,750,070 279,209 2,104,371 157,240 967,681 636,895 3,823,921
Consumer Price Index (index, 1990=100) 38.5 53.6 26.5 47.0 24.0 42.7 33.8 57.5
Imports (nominal, local currency) 727,105 4,537,138 432,462 3,379,563 214,465 1,297,068 1,088,848 6,364,736
Exports (nominal, local currency) 698,994 4,404,564 377,230 2,803,380 193,327 1,148,365 930,960 5,231,814
Short-term Interest Rate (nominal, percent per year) 4.77 3.24 5.13 3.25 4.97 3.23 5.57 3.30
Long-term Interest Rate (nominal, percent per year) 5.50 3.07 5.35 3.04 5.39 3.22 5.23 2.46
TABLE 1.2
Advanced Economy: Likelihood of a Banking Crisis
Probability of a Banking Crisis (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Demeaned Private Credit / GDP 0.55   0.75*   8.02*** 8.04***
(0.40) (0.41) (2.57) (2.62) 
Demeaned Public Debt / GDP -0.21   -0.26   0.83   1.75   
(0.27) (0.32) (1.52) (1.21) 
Lagged Demeaned Private Credit / GDP -7.49*** -7.47***
(2.60) (2.67) 
Lagged Demeaned Public Debt / GDP -1.00   -1.93   
(1.60) (1.30) 
YoY Change in Private Credit / GDP 8.58***
(2.74) 
YoY Change in Public Debt / GDP 1.75   
(1.10) 
Psuedo-R 2 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.04
Observations 2,308 2,358 2,204 2,279 2,329 2,172 2,172
Notes: The table shows logistic model classifiers where the dependent variable is the banking crisis event indicator variable, and the regressors are demeaned lags
and / or levels of private credit / GDP and public debt / GDP. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Country fixed effects in all models, not reported.
Private Credit / GDP and Public Debt / GDP are ratios, thus a single hunderth change of the ratio equals a one percent change: 0.01 = 1%.




Advanced Economy: GDP Recession Paths, Normal versus Banking Bins, Replication of Prior Study
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Log real GDP per capita (relative to year 0, ×100) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Normal Recession -2.15*** -0.09  2.01*** 3.33*** 4.66***
(0.17)  (0.30) (0.41) (0.58) (0.67) 
Banking-Crisis Recession -2.83*** -3.35*** -2.53*** -0.79   0.54   
(0.42)  (0.61) (0.91) (1.18) (1.08) 
R 2 0.46 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.17
F -test equality of coefficients, Normal = Banking (p ) 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations, Normal 174 174 174 174 174
Observations, Banking-Crisis 62 62 62 62 62
Observations 236 236 236 236 236
Notes: Dependent variable: Δh yit(r)+h  = (change in log real GDP per capita from year 0 to year h ) × 100. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.




Advanced Economy: GDP Recession Paths, Normal versus Banking Bins by Within Country Public Debt Terciles
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Panel A: Log real GDP per capita (relative to year 0, ×100) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Normal Recession
†
-2.07*** -0.20   1.82*** 3.26*** 4.68***
(0.16)  (0.27) (0.36) (0.50) (0.58) 
Banking-Crisis Recession
†
-2.69*** -2.75*** -2.24*** -0.58   0.55   
(0.32)  (0.54) (0.73) (0.95) (0.87) 
R 2 0.45 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.19
F -test equality of coefficients, Normal = Banking (p ) 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations, Normal 213 213 213 213 213
Observations, Banking-Crisis 84 84 84 84 84
Observations 297 297 297 297 297
Panel B: Log real GDP per capita (relative to year 0, ×100) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Low Debt × Normal Recession -2.01*** 0.49   3.12*** 4.83*** 6.31***
(0.27)  (0.45) (0.55) (0.68) (0.83) 
Medium Debt × Normal Recession -2.19*** -0.49   1.21*   2.52*** 3.94***
(0.26)  (0.39) (0.65) (0.96) (1.19) 
High Debt × Normal Recession -1.92*** -0.24   1.62** 3.15*** 4.22***
(0.26)  (0.57) (0.66) (0.92) (0.98) 
Low Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -2.96*** -3.08*** -2.36   -1.32   1.13   
(0.62)  (0.90) (1.50) (1.82) (1.57) 
Medium Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -2.56*** -3.73*** -3.01** -1.60   -0.44   
(0.68)  (1.17) (1.34) (1.94) (1.84) 
High Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -2.47*** -1.57*   -1.87*   0.81   0.68   
(0.47)  (0.90) (1.02) (1.23) (1.15) 
R 2 0.47 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.20
F -test equality of coefficients, Low interaction terms (p ) 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F -test equality of coefficients, Medium interaction terms (p ) 0.61 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.05
F -test equality of coefficients, High interaction terms (p ) 0.30 0.22 0.00 0.13 0.02
Normal Recessions:
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × N = Medium × N (p ) 0.65 0.10 0.03 0.05 0.10
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × N = High × N (p ) 0.80 0.32 0.08 0.14 0.11
Banking-Crisis Recessions:
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × BC = Medium × BC (p ) 0.66 0.66 0.75 0.92 0.52
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × BC = High × BC (p ) 0.53 0.24 0.79 0.33 0.82
Observations, Normal 202 202 202 202 202
Observations, Banking-Crisis 78 78 78 78 78
Observations 280 280 280 280 280
Notes: Dependent variable: Δh yit(r)+h  = (change in log real GDP per capita from year 0 to year h ) × 100. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Significance Levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
†The results of these regressions differ slightly from Table 1.3 because these regressions include years after 2007 (which for some nations covers the Great




Advanced Economy: Government Spending Recession Paths, Normal versus Banking Bins by Within Country Public Debt Terciles
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Panel A: Percent Δ in Government Expenditures (relative to year 0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Normal Recession 6.58*** 13.00*** 18.99*** 27.86*** 35.04***
(0.93)  (1.57) (1.92) (2.72) (3.51) 
Banking-Crisis Recession 4.84*** 8.44*** 10.79*** 14.17*** 18.30***
(1.68)  (2.24)  (2.59) (3.10) (3.70) 
R 2 0.17 0.23 0.30 0.33 0.32
F -test equality of coefficients, Normal = Banking (p ) 0.37 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.00
Observations, Normal 200 200 200 200 200
Observations, Banking-Crisis 80 80 80 80 80
Observations 280 280 280 280 280
Panel B: Percent Δ in Government Expenditures (relative to year 0) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Low Debt × Normal Recession 10.61*** 21.97*** 30.82*** 46.14*** 58.67***
(2.27)  (4.10)  (4.95) (7.09) (9.32) 
Medium Debt × Normal Recession 4.92*** 10.52*** 16.14*** 21.98*** 28.01***
(1.07)  (1.64)  (2.10) (2.58) (3.16) 
High Debt × Normal Recession 3.78*** 6.84*** 10.18*** 15.74*** 19.77***
(1.46)  (1.62)  (2.11) (3.16) (3.84) 
Low Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession 7.96*** 7.84*   9.86** 10.71** 18.96***
(3.02)  (4.02) (4.55) (5.05) (6.43) 
Medium Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession 3.82**  8.13** 11.91** 16.44*** 19.22** 
(1.66)  (3.72) (5.35) (6.17) (7.69) 
High Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession 1.18    7.15*** 8.42** 11.47*** 12.54***
(2.12)  (2.74) (3.51) (4.20) (4.40) 
R 2 0.21 0.29 0.35 0.39 0.39
F -test equality of coefficients, Low interaction terms (p ) 0.48 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
F -test equality of coefficients, Medium interaction terms (p ) 0.58 0.56 0.46 0.41 0.29
F -test equality of coefficients, High interaction terms (p ) 0.31 0.92 0.67 0.42 0.22
Normal Recessions:
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × N = Medium × N (p ) 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × N = High × N (p ) 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Banking-Crisis Recessions:
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × BC = Medium × BC (p ) 0.23 0.96 0.77 0.47 0.98
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × BC = High × BC (p ) 0.07 0.89 0.80 0.91 0.41
Observations, Normal 191 191 191 191 191
Observations, Banking-Crisis 75 75 75 75 75
Observations 266 266 266 266 266
Notes: Dependent variable: Δh yit(r)+h  = (change in log real GDP per capita from year 0 to year h ) × 100. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.




Advanced Economy: Investment Recession Paths, Normal versus Banking Bins by Within Country Public Debt Terciles
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Panel A: Log real investment per capita (relative to year 0, ×100) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Normal Recession -3.50*** -2.06   -0.08   0.81   3.79*   
(0.83)  (1.25) (1.45) (1.85) (2.10) 
Banking-Crisis Recession -8.17*** -14.71*** -17.48*** -15.94*** -13.57***
(1.82)  (2.75)  (4.60)  (4.73)  (3.90)  
R 2 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.07 0.06
F -test equality of coefficients, Normal = Banking (p ) 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations, Normal 198 198 198 198 198
Observations, Banking-Crisis 71 71 71 71 71
Observations 269 269 269 269 269
Panel B: Log real investment per capita (relative to year 0, ×100) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Low Debt × Normal Recession -4.49*** -2.32  1.04   1.74   4.75   
(1.26)  (1.98) (2.25) (2.74) (3.20) 
Medium Debt × Normal Recession -3.24*   -2.87   -2.45   -1.94   -0.37   
(1.65)  (2.05) (2.43) (3.40) (4.01) 
High Debt × Normal Recession -1.39    1.49   4.18   7.01** 10.85***
(1.38)  (2.58) (3.06) (3.56) (3.92) 
Low Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -13.40*** -24.75*** -31.90*** -29.45*** -21.41***
(2.72)  (4.51)  (10.77) (10.35) (7.82) 
Medium Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -7.69**  -15.11*** -15.71*** -16.76** -16.73** 
(3.77)  (4.79)  (5.52) (6.92) (6.60) 
High Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -5.89**  -8.55**  -10.97** -7.49   -7.95*   
(2.27)  (3.38)  (4.84) (5.06) (4.50) 
R 2 0.18 0.21 0.17 0.13 0.10
F -test equality of coefficients, Low interaction terms (p ) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F -test equality of coefficients, Medium interaction terms (p ) 0.28 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.04
F -test equality of coefficients, High interaction terms (p ) 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00
Normal Recessions:
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × N = Medium × N (p ) 0.55 0.85 0.29 0.40 0.32
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × N = High × N (p ) 0.10 0.24 0.41 0.24 0.23
Banking-Crisis Recessions:
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × BC = Medium × BC (p ) 0.22 0.15 0.18 0.31 0.65
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × BC = High × BC (p ) 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.06 0.14
Observations, Normal 187 187 187 187 187
Observations, Banking-Crisis 65 65 65 65 65
Observations 252 252 252 252 252
Notes: Dependent variable: Δh yit(r)+h  = (change in log real GDP per capita from year 0 to year h ) × 100. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Significance Levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Figure 1.1   Advanced Economy: Normal vs. Banking GDP Recession Paths
 
Figure 1.2   Advanced Economy: Normal Recession GDP Paths, Within Country Debt Terciles 
 











































Figure 1.4   Advanced Economy: Normal vs. Banking Government Expenditure Recession Paths 
 
Figure 1.5   Advanced Economy: Normal Recession Gov. Exp. Paths, Within Country Debt Terciles 
 





































Figure 1.7   Advanced Economy: Normal vs. Banking Investment Recession Paths 
 
Figure 1.8   Advanced Economy: Normal Recession Investment Paths, Within Country Debt Terciles 
 
Figure 1.9   Advanced Economy: Banking Recession Investment Paths, Within Country Debt Terciles 





































8.2   Emerging Economy Tables and Figures 




Emerging Economy Summary Statistics
All Country Years All Recession Peaks Normal Recession Peaks Banking Recession Peaks
N = 3,332 471 430 41
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Real GDP per capita (2017 USD$) 8,931.85 11,874.12 8,404.66 11,590.16 7,921.47 10,502.19 13,472.21 19,147.89
Real GDP (2017 USD$, millions) 223,552 559,609 172,899 376,110 162,442 372,893 282,570 396,655
Real Investment per capita (2017 USD$) 2,176.26 3,847.95 2,081.85 3,756.81 1,914.02 3,361.40 3,841.98 6,416.76
General Government Debt to GDP ratio (%) 50.1 37.0 47.7 38.1 47.7 38.6 47.2 32.5
Private, Non-Financial Sector Credit to GDP ratio (%) 39.8 53.6 34.9 55.2 31.2 43.2 74.4 120.5
Banking Crisis Indicator 0.022 0.147 0.087 0.187 0 0 1 0
Government Expenditures (2017 USD$, millions) 33,637 76,133 28,575 67,575 17,849 68,958 36,187 50,893
TABLE 2.2
Emerging Economy: Likelihood of a Banking Crisis
Probability of a Banking Crisis (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Demeaned Private Credit / GDP 1.81*** 1.62*** 2.82   2.44   
(0.59) (0.55) (1.86) (1.68) 
Demeaned Public Debt / GDP 1.20*** 1.19*** 1.79** 1.95** 
(0.31) (0.40) (0.78) (0.91) 
Lagged Demeaned Private Credit / GDP -1.06   -0.95   
(1.73) (1.65) 
Lagged Demeaned Public Debt / GDP -0.84   -1.04   
(0.88) (0.97) 
YoY Change in Private Credit / GDP 1.79   
(1.58) 
YoY Change in Public Debt / GDP 2.03*   
(1.07) 
Psuedo-R 2 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.04
Observations 2,205 2,646 2,205 2,153 2,592 2,153 2,153
Notes: The table shows logistic model classifiers where the dependent variable is the banking crisis event indicator variable, and the regressors are demeaned lags
and / or levels of private credit / GDP and public debt / GDP. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Country fixed effects in all models, not reported.
Private Credit / GDP and Public Debt / GDP are ratios, thus a single hunderth change of the ratio equals a one percent change: 0.01 = 1%.




Emerging Economy: GDP Recession Paths, Normal versus Banking Bins by Within Country Public Debt Terciles
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Panel A: Log real GDP per capita (relative to year 0, ×100) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Normal Recession -3.24*** -3.08*** -2.25*** -1.53** -0.78   
(0.19)  (0.37) (0.46) (0.59) (0.73) 
Banking-Crisis Recession -4.52*** -5.54*** -5.25*** -4.75*** -3.94** 
(0.57)  (0.97) (1.22) (1.40) (1.73) 
R 2 0.44 0.18 0.08 0.03 0.01
F -test equality of coefficients, Normal = Banking (p ) 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.09
Observations, Normal 401 401 401 401 401
Observations, Banking-Crisis 41 41 41 41 41
Observations 442 442 442 442 442
Panel B: Log real GDP per capita (relative to year 0, ×100) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Low Debt × Normal Recession -3.45*** -2.77*** -1.85*** -1.47   -0.77   
(0.33)  (0.53) (0.71) (0.93) (1.13) 
Medium Debt × Normal Recession -3.03*** -3.11*** -2.73*** -2.31** -2.29   
(0.34)  (0.63) (0.79) (1.06) (1.43) 
High Debt × Normal Recession -3.12*** -3.56*** -2.45*** -0.85   0.66   
(0.29)  (0.82) (0.88) (1.09) (1.30) 
Low Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -4.83*** -8.01*** -7.70*** -6.65*** -4.92*   
(1.15)  (1.63) (2.30) (2.48) (2.60) 
Medium Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -2.63*** -2.27*   -1.72   -1.82   -2.35   
(0.49)  (1.30) (1.38) (1.69) (2.96) 
High Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -5.11*** -4.92*** -4.79*** -4.46** -3.83   
(0.81)  (1.49) (1.78) (2.25) (3.04) 
R 2 0.44 0.19 0.09 0.03 0.02
F -test equality of coefficients, Low interaction terms (p ) 0.25 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.14
F -test equality of coefficients, Medium interaction terms (p ) 0.51 0.56 0.53 0.81 0.99
F -test equality of coefficients, High interaction terms (p ) 0.02 0.42 0.24 0.15 0.18
Normal Recessions:
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × N = Medium × N (p ) 0.37 0.68 0.41 0.55 0.40
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × N = High × N (p ) 0.45 0.42 0.60 0.67 0.41
Banking-Crisis Recessions:
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × BC = Medium × BC (p ) 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.51
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × BC = High × BC (p ) 0.84 0.16 0.32 0.51 0.78
Observations, Normal 401 401 401 401 401
Observations, Banking-Crisis 41 41 41 41 41
Observations 442 442 442 442 442
Notes: Dependent variable: Δh yit(r)+h  = (change in log real GDP per capita from year 0 to year h ) × 100. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.





Emerigng Economy: Government Spending Recession Paths, Normal versus Banking Bins by Within Country Public Debt Terciles
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Panel A: Percent Δ in Government Expenditures (relative to year 0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Normal Recession 2.14*** 5.32*** 8.50*** 11.90*** 15.42***
(0.62)  (0.99) (1.30) (1.62) (1.90) 
Banking-Crisis Recession 1.52   4.63   5.35*   8.90** 9.22** 
(1.77)  (3.14) (3.17) (3.65) (4.43) 
R 2 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.14
F -test equality of coefficients, Normal = Banking (p ) 0.74 0.83 0.36 0.45 0.20
Observations, Normal 401 401 401 401 401
Observations, Banking-Crisis 41 41 41 41 41
Observations 442 442 442 442 442
Panel B: Percent Δ in Government Expenditures (relative to year 0) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Low Debt × Normal Recession 4.48*** 10.08*** 15.21*** 19.74*** 25.50***
(0.77)  (1.42)  (1.88) (2.31) (2.95) 
Medium Debt × Normal Recession 0.92   1.73   3.46   6.97** 7.39** 
(1.37)  (1.73)  (2.36) (3.18) (3.49) 
High Debt × Normal Recession -0.58   0.85   2.19   3.56   6.38** 
(1.22)  (2.03)  (2.49) (2.96) (3.08) 
Low Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession 6.92*** 14.02** 13.58** 19.95*** 24.59***
(2.54)  (6.05) (5.35) (4.96) (6.09) 
Medium Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession 2.10   7.48** 13.56*** 17.90** 18.83***
(1.31)  (3.02) (4.77) (7.25) (5.53) 
High Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -3.23   -4.47   -5.15   -4.31   -7.85   
(2.98)  (3.93) (4.13) (4.96) (6.43) 
R 2 0.07 0.12 0.15 0.17 0.20
F -test equality of coefficients, Low interaction terms (p ) 0.36 0.53 0.77 0.97 0.89
F -test equality of coefficients, Medium interaction terms (p ) 0.54 0.10 0.06 0.17 0.08
F -test equality of coefficients, High interaction terms (p ) 0.41 0.23 0.13 0.17 0.05
Normal Recessions:
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × N = Medium × N (p ) 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × N = High × N (p ) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Banking-Crisis Recessions:
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × BC = Medium × BC (p ) 0.09 0.33 1.00 0.82 0.48
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × BC = High × BC (p ) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Observations, Normal 401 401 401 401 401
Observations, Banking-Crisis 41 41 41 41 41
Observations 442 442 442 442 442
Notes: Dependent variable: Δh yit(r)+h  = (change in log real GDP per capita from year 0 to year h ) × 100. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.




Emerging Economy: Investment Recession Paths, Normal versus Banking Bins by Within Country Public Debt Terciles
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Panel A: Log real investment per capita (relative to year 0, ×100) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Normal Recession -6.91*** -6.84*** -5.04*** -3.99*   -3.07   
(1.21)  (1.49) (1.84) (2.12) (2.42) 
Banking-Crisis Recession -17.09*** -21.33*** -19.58*** -14.82**  -12.70*    
(4.66)  (6.88)  (5.86)  (6.96)  (7.62)  
R 2 0.1 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.01
F -test equality of coefficients, Normal = Banking (p ) 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.14 0.23
Observations, Normal 400 400 400 400 400
Observations, Banking-Crisis 41 41 41 41 41
Observations 441 441 441 441 441
Panel B: Log real investment per capita (relative to year 0, ×100) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Low Debt × Normal Recession -5.72*** -4.31*   -3.21   -2.65   -3.45   
(1.83)  (2.21) (3.01) (3.29) (3.95) 
Medium Debt × Normal Recession -6.00*** -7.40*** -4.89   -5.84   -5.26   
(2.22)  (2.83) (3.34) (3.61) (3.95) 
High Debt × Normal Recession -9.79*** -10.53*** -8.22*** -4.43   -0.32   
(2.33)  (2.89) (3.04) (4.17) (4.46) 
Low Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -17.51*** -36.97*** -39.35*** -38.08*** -36.57***
(6.58)  (8.08) (7.65) (8.29) (8.71) 
Medium Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -8.13**  -11.71  -4.42   -14.25  -10.53   
(3.73)  (8.61) (9.11) (9.26) (9.83) 
High Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -20.72** -12.56  -9.85   4.32   6.23   
(8.83)  (13.02) (9.68) (11.95) (13.61) 
R 2 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.04 0.03
F -test equality of coefficients, Low interaction terms (p ) 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F -test equality of coefficients, Medium interaction terms (p ) 0.62 0.63 0.96 0.40 0.62
F -test equality of coefficients, High interaction terms (p ) 0.23 0.88 0.87 0.49 0.65
Normal Recessions:
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × N = Medium × N (p ) 0.92 0.39 0.71 0.51 0.75
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × N = High × N (p ) 0.17 0.09 0.24 0.74 0.60
Banking-Crisis Recessions:
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × BC = Medium × BC (p ) 0.22 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.05
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × BC = High × BC (p ) 0.77 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.01
Observations, Normal 400 400 400 400 400
Observations, Banking-Crisis 41 41 41 41 41
Observations 441 441 441 441 441
Notes: Dependent variable: Δh yit(r)+h  = (change in log real GDP per capita from year 0 to year h ) × 100. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Significance Levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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 Figure 2.1   Emerging Economy: Normal vs. Banking GDP Recession Paths 
 
Figure 2.2   Emerging Economy: Normal Recession GDP Paths, Within Country Debt Terciles 
 





































Figure 2.4   Emerging Economy: Normal vs. Banking Government Expenditure Recession Paths 
 
Figure 2.5   Emerging Economy: Normal Recession Gov. Exp. Paths, Within Country Debt Terciles 
 









































Figure 2.7   Emerging Economy: Normal vs. Banking Investment Recession Paths 
 
Figure 2.8   Emerging Economy: Normal Recession Investment Paths, Within Country Debt Terciles 
 
Figure 2.9   Emerging Economy: Banking Recession Investment Paths, Within Country Debt Terciles 


































 Bordo, M., Eichengreen, B., Klingebiel, D., Martinez-Peria, M. S., & Rose, A. K. (2001). Is the Crisis 
Problem Growing More Severe? Economic Policy, 16(32), 53–82. 
Bry, G., & Boschan, C. (1971). Cyclical Analysis of Time Series: Selected Procedures and Computer 
Programs. National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Feenstra, Robert C., Robert Inklaar and Marcel P. Timmer (2015), "The Next Generation of the Penn World 
Table" American Economic Review, 105(10), pp. 3150-3182. 
International Monetary Fund. “Fiscal Monitor: Policies for the Recovery,” April 2021. 
Jordà, Ò. (2005). Estimation and Inference of Impulse Responses by Local Projections. American Economic 
Review, 95(1), 161–182. 
Jordà, Ò., Schularick, M., & Taylor, A. M. (2011). Financial Crises, Credit Booms, and External 
Imbalances: 140 Years of Lessons. IMF Economic Review, Vol. 59(2), 340–378. 
Jordà, Ò., Schularick, M., & Taylor, A. M. (2013). When Credit Bites Back: Leverage, Business Cycles, 
and Crises. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 45(2), 3–28. 
Jordá, Ò., Schularick, M., & Taylor, A. M. (2016). Sovereigns Versus Banks: Credit, Crises, and 
Consequences. Journal of the European Economic Association, 14(1), 45–79. 
Jordá, Ò., Schularick, M., & Taylor, A. M. (2017) “Macrofinancial History and the New Business Cycle 
Facts.” in NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2016, volume 31. University of Chicago Press. 
Koh, W. C., Kose, M. A., Nagle, P., Ohnsorge, F., & Sugawara, N. (2020). Debt and Financial Crises. 
Centre for Economic Policy Research, Working Paper DP14442. 
Laeven, L., & Valencia, F. (2018). Systemic Banking Crises Revisited. IMF. 
Mbaye, S., Moreno Badia, M., & Chae, K. (2018). Global Debt Database. International Monetary Fund, 
Working Paper No. 18/111, 52. 
Mitchell, B. (2007). International Historical Statistics: 1750-2005, The Americas (6th ed.). Palgrave 
Macmillan UK. 
Omeokwe, Amara. “U.S. Unemployment Claims Hit New Covid-19 Pandemic Low.” Wall Street Journal, 
April 22, 2021, sec. Economy. 
Reinhart, C. M., Reinhart, V. R., & Rogoff, K. S. (2012). Public Debt Overhangs: Advanced-Economy 
Episodes Since 1800. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 26(3), 69–86. 
Reinhart, C. M., & Rogoff, K. S. (2009). The Aftermath of Financial Crises. The American Economic 
Review, Vol. 99(2), 466–472. 
Reinhart, C. M., & Rogoff, K. S. (2013). Banking Crises: An Equal Opportunity Menace. Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 37(11), 4557–4573. 
Reinhart, C. M., & Rogoff, K. S. (2011b). From Financial Crash to Debt Crisis. The American Economic 
Review, Vol. 101(5), 1676–1706. 
Reinhart, C. M., & Rogoff, K. S. (2011a). The Forgotten History of Domestic Debt. The Economic Journal, 
Vol. 121(552), 319–350. 
Romer, C. D., & Romer, D. H. (2017). New Evidence on the Aftermath of Financial Crises in Advanced 
Countries. American Economic Review, 107(10), 3072–3118. 
Romer, C. D., & Romer, D. H. (2018). Why Some Times Are Different: Macroeconomic Policy and the 
Aftermath of Financial Crises. Economica, 85(337), 1–40. 
Romer, C. D., & Romer, D. H. (2019). Fiscal Space and the Aftermath of Financial Crises: How It Matters 
and Why. National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 58 
Rubin, Richard, and Eliza Collins. “Biden Proposes $1.9 Trillion Covid-19 Relief Package.” Wall Street 
Journal, January 15, 2021, sec. Politics. 
Schularick, M., & Taylor, A. M. (2012). Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles, and 





















































Congo, Dem. Rep. 







































































TABLE A.1      Advanced Economy Variable Definitions
Variable Units Definition Source
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Local Currency, 
Nominal, millions
Market value of all final goods and servies produced by
an economy, measured yearly.
Jordá, Schularick, and Taylor Macrohistory Database, 
version R5 (March 2021) and sources therein
Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per 
capita
Index (2005 = 
100)
Market value of a final goods and servies produced by an 
economy per person, measured yearly. Index allows me
to examine growth rates more closely and create my own
real GDP metric using poplation levels.
Jordá, Schularick, and Taylor Macrohistory Database, 
version R5 (March 2021) and sources therein
Gross Fixed Capital Formation to GDP 
Ratio
% The acquisition of produced assets, including production
of such assets by producers for their own use, minus
disposals, divided by GDP. The relevant assets relate to
assets that are intended for use in the production of other
goods and services for a period of more than a year.
Jordá, Schularick, and Taylor Macrohistory Database, 
version R5 (March 2021) and sources therein
International Historical Statistics, 1750-2005 (2007)
Consumer Price Index Index (1990 = 
100)
Measure of the average change over time in the prices
paid by consumers for a market basket of consumer
goods and services, measured within each country.
Jordá, Schularick, and Taylor Macrohistory Database, 
version R5 (March 2021) and sources therein
Current Account Balance Local Currency, 
Nominal, millions
Value of exported goods and services minus value of
imported goods and services, measured yearly.
Jordá, Schularick, and Taylor Macrohistory Database, 
version R5 (March 2021) and sources therein
Imports Local Currency, 
Nominal, millions
Foreign goods and services bought by individuals,
businesses, or the government, measured yearly.
Jordá, Schularick, and Taylor Macrohistory Database, 
version R5 (March 2021) and sources therein
Exports Local Currency, 
Nominal, millions
Domestic goods and services bought by foreign
individuals, businesses, or governments, measured yearly.
Jordá, Schularick, and Taylor Macrohistory Database, 
version R5 (March 2021) and sources therein
Short-Term Interest Rate Basis Points, 
Nominal
Interest rate on the shortest Central Bank or Treasury note 
(typically three month), annualized rate.
Jordá, Schularick, and Taylor Macrohistory Database, 
version R5 (March 2021) and sources therein
Long-Term Interest Rate Basis Points, 
Nominal
Interest rate on a longer-term Treasury note (typically the
five or ten year note), annualized rate.
Jordá, Schularick, and Taylor Macrohistory Database, 
version R5 (March 2021) and sources therein
General Government Debt to GDP Ratio % Total (domestic plus external)1 general government
(central government and regional / state / local
government) debt divided by GDP.
Jordá, Schularick, and Taylor Macrohistory Database, 
version R5 (March 2021) and sources therein
Reinhart & Rogoff (2011)




Total loans outstanding to individuals, households, and
non-financial businesses, measured yearly.
Jordá, Schularick, and Taylor Macrohistory Database, 
version R5 (March 2021) and sources therein
Population Thousands of 
persons
Total persons residing in a given nation. Jordá, Schularick, and Taylor Macrohistory Database, 
version R5 (March 2021) and sources therein
Banking Crisis Indicator {0,1} =1 if onset of banking crisis during given country year
=0 otherwise
Jordá, Schularick, and Taylor Macrohistory Database, 
version R5 (March 2021) and sources therein
Real Investment per capita Index Purchases of produced assets less disposals per person,
measured yearly.
= Real GDP per capita × Gross Fixed Capital Formation to 
GDP Ratio
Jordá, Schularick, and Taylor Macrohistory Database, 
version R5 (March 2021) and sources therein
Expansion Peak {0,1} Identify business cycle peaks using real GDP per capita.
If GDP per capita growth was negative in any given year,
the preceding year was coded as a business cycle peak.
=1 (in year t ) if real GDP per capita growth was negative
from year t  to year t +1
=0 otherwise
Jordá, Schularick, and Taylor Macrohistory Database, 
version R5 (March 2021) and sources therein
Banking Crisis Peak {0,1} Onset of a banking-crisis recession, when a recession and
a banking crisis temporally conicide.
=1 if Expansion peak = 1 and Banking Crisis Indicator =
1 within the two years preceding (-2) or succeeding (+2)
the year when Expansion Peak = 1
=0 otherwise
Jordá, Schularick, and Taylor Macrohistory Database, 
version R5 (March 2021) and sources therein
Normal Crisis Peak {0,1} Onset of a normal recession (no banking cirsis).
=1 if Expansion Peak = 1 and Banking Crisis Peak = 0
=0 otherwise
Jordá, Schularick, and Taylor Macrohistory Database, 
version R5 (March 2021) and sources therein
Change in log real GDP per capita from 
year 0 to year h  (Δh y it(r)+h )
Difference of the natural logarithm of real GDP per
capita for country i in year t(r) and the natural logarithm
of real GDP per capita for country i  in year t(r)+h
=ln(rGDP per capita)it (r ) – ln(rGDP per capita)it(r)+h
Jordá, Schularick, and Taylor Macrohistory Database, 
version R5 (March 2021) and sources therein
Change in log real investment per capita 
from year 0 to year h  (Δh w it(r)+h )
Difference of the natural logarithm of real investment per
capita for country i in year t(r) and the natural logarithm
of real investment per capita for country i  in year t(r)+h
=ln(rInvest per capita)it (r ) – ln(rInvest per capita)it(r)+h
Jordá, Schularick, and Taylor Macrohistory Database, 
version R5 (March 2021) and sources therein
Lowest Public Debt Level Tercile {0,1} =1 if Public Debt to GDP Ratio falls in lowest tercile
(terciles calculated within each country)
=0 otherwise
Jordá, Schularick, and Taylor Macrohistory Database, 
version R5 (March 2021) and sources therein
Middle Public Debt Level Tercile {0,1} =1 if Public Debt to GDP Ratio falls in middle tercile
(terciles calculated within each country)
=0 otherwise
Jordá, Schularick, and Taylor Macrohistory Database, 
version R5 (March 2021) and sources therein
Highest Public Debt Level Tercile {0,1} =1 if Public Debt to GDP Ratio falls in highest tercile
(terciles calculated within each country)
=0 otherwise
Jordá, Schularick, and Taylor Macrohistory Database, 
version R5 (March 2021) and sources therein
Private Credit to GDP Ratio % = Total Loans to Non-Financial Private Sector / GDP Jordá, Schularick, and Taylor Macrohistory Database, 
version R5 (March 2021) and sources therein




TABLE A.2      Emerging Economy Variable Definitions
Variable Units Definition Source
Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 2017 USD$, 
millions
Market value of all final goods and servies produced by
an economy, measured yearly.
Penn World Table, Version 10.0 (January 28, 2021 
update) and sources therein
Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per 
capita
2017 USD$ Market value of a final goods and servies produced by an 
economy per person, measured yearly. Index allows me
to examine growth rates more closely and create my own
real GDP metric using poplation levels.
Penn World Table, Version 10.0 (January 28, 2021 
update) and sources therein
Gross Fixed Capital Formation to GDP 
Ratio
% The acquisition of produced assets, including production
of such assets by producers for their own use, minus
disposals, divided by GDP. The relevant assets relate to
assets that are intended for use in the production of other
goods and services for a period of more than a year.
Penn World Table, Version 10.0 (January 28, 2021 
update) and sources therein
Consumer Price Index Index (2017 = 
100)
Measure of the average change over time in the prices
paid by consumers for a market basket of consumer
goods and services, measured within each country.
Penn World Table, Version 10.0 (January 28, 2021 
update) and sources therein
Imports to GDP Ratio % Foreign goods and services bought by individuals,
businesses, or the government, divided by GDP.
Penn World Table, Version 10.0 (January 28, 2021 
update) and sources therein
Exports to GDP Ratio % Domestic goods and services bought by foreign
individuals, businesses, or governments, divided by GDP.
Penn World Table, Version 10.0 (January 28, 2021 
update) and sources therein
General Government Debt to GDP Ratio % Total (domestic plus external)1 general government
(central government and regional / state / local
government) debt divided by GDP.
International Monetary Fund, Global Debt Database 
(May 14, 2018 update) and sources therein
Total Debt and Loans of Non-Financial 
Private Sector to GDP Ratio
% Total debt + loans outstanding to individuals, households, 
and non-financial businesses, divided by GDP.
International Monetary Fund, Global Debt Database 
(May 14, 2018 update) and sources therein
Population Millions of 
persons
Total persons residing in a given nation. Penn World Table, Version 10.0 (January 28, 2021 
update) and sources therein
Banking Crisis Indicator {0,1} =1 if onset of banking crisis during given country year
=0 otherwise
Database of Systemic Banking Crises, Laeven and 
Valencia (2018 update)
Real Investment per capita 2017 USD$ Purchases of produced assets less disposals per person,
measured yearly.
= Real GDP per capita × Gross Fixed Capital Formation to 
GDP Ratio
Penn World Table, Version 10.0 (January 28, 2021 
update) and sources therein
Expansion Peak {0,1} Identify business cycle peaks using real GDP per capita.
If GDP per capita growth was negative in any given year,
the preceding year was coded as a business cycle peak.
=1 (in year t ) if real GDP per capita growth was negative
from year t  to year t +1
=0 otherwise
Penn World Table, Version 10.0 (January 28, 2021 
update) and sources therein and Database of Systemic 
Banking Crises, Laeven and Valencia (2018 update)
Banking Crisis Peak {0,1} Onset of a banking-crisis recession, when a recession and
a banking crisis temporally conicide.
=1 if Expansion peak = 1 and Banking Crisis Indicator =
1 within the two years preceding (-2) or succeeding (+2)
the year when Expansion Peak = 1
=0 otherwise
Penn World Table, Version 10.0 (January 28, 2021 
update) and sources therein and Database of Systemic 
Banking Crises, Laeven and Valencia (2018 update)
Normal Crisis Peak {0,1} Onset of a normal recession (no banking cirsis).
=1 if Expansion Peak = 1 and Banking Crisis Peak = 0
=0 otherwise
Penn World Table, Version 10.0 (January 28, 2021 
update) and sources therein and Database of Systemic 
Banking Crises, Laeven and Valencia (2018 update)
Change in log real GDP per capita from 
year 0 to year h  (Δh y it(r)+h )
Difference of the natural logarithm of real GDP per
capita for country i in year t(r) and the natural logarithm
of real GDP per capita for country i  in year t(r)+h
=ln(rGDP per capita)it (r ) – ln(rGDP per capita)it(r)+h
Penn World Table, Version 10.0 (January 28, 2021 
update) and sources therein
Change in log real investment per capita 
from year 0 to year h  (Δh w it(r)+h )
Difference of the natural logarithm of real investment per
capita for country i in year t(r) and the natural logarithm
of real investment per capita for country i  in year t(r)+h
=ln(rInvest per capita)it (r ) – ln(rInvest per capita)it(r)+h
Penn World Table, Version 10.0 (January 28, 2021 
update) and sources therein
Lowest Public Debt Level Tercile {0,1} =1 if Public Debt to GDP Ratio falls in lowest tercile
(terciles calculated within each country)
=0 otherwise
International Monetary Fund, Global Debt Database 
(May 14, 2018 update) and sources therein
Middle Public Debt Level Tercile {0,1} =1 if Public Debt to GDP Ratio falls in middle tercile
(terciles calculated within each country)
=0 otherwise
International Monetary Fund, Global Debt Database 
(May 14, 2018 update) and sources therein
Highest Public Debt Level Tercile {0,1} =1 if Public Debt to GDP Ratio falls in highest tercile
(terciles calculated within each country)
=0 otherwise
International Monetary Fund, Global Debt Database 
(May 14, 2018 update) and sources therein
Total Non-Financial Private Sector Debt 2017 USD$ = Total Debt and Loans of Non-Financial Private Sector
to GDP Ratio * Real GDP
Penn World Table, Version 10.0 and International 
Monetary Fund, Global Debt Database
1Please recall that domestic debt is defined as liabilities of the public and private sector under domestic law, and external debt is defined as total liabilities of a country with foreign creditors, both official (public) and
private.
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Business Cycle Dating (Peak Identification)
 
TABLE A.3
Advanced Economy Recession Chronology
Australia N 1875 1878 1881 1883 1885 1887 1889 1896 1898 1900 1904 1910
1913 1926 1938 1943 1951 1956 1961 1973 1976 1981 2008
B 1891 1894 1989
Belgium N 1874 1890 1900 1913 1916 1942 1951 1957 1974 1980 1992 2011
B 1870 1872 1883 1887 1926 1930 1937 2007
Canada N 1871 1877 1882 1884 1888 1891 1894 1903 1913 1917 1928 1944
1947 1953 1956 1981 1989 2007 2014
B 1874 1907
Switzerland N 1875 1880 1886 1890 1893 1899 1902 1906 1916 1920 1939 1947
1951 1957 1974 1981 1994 2001 2011
B 1871 1912 1929 1933 1990 2008
Germany N 1879 1898 1905 1913 1922 1943 1966 1974 1980 1992 2001
B 1875 1890 1908 1928 2008
Denmark N 1870 1880 1887 1911 1914 1916 1923 1939 1944 1950 1962 1973
1979 1992 2011
B 1872 1876 1883 1920 1931 1987 2007
Spain N 1873 1877 1892 1894 1901 19009 1916 1927 1932 1935 1944 1947
1952 1958 1980 1992
B 1884 1888 1911 1913 1925 1929 2007
Finland N 1870 1883 1890 1907 1913 1916 1938 1941 1943 1952 1957 1975
2008 2011
B 1876 1898 1900 1929 1989
France N 1872 1874 1892 1894 1896 1900 1905 1909 1912 1916 1920 1926
1933 1937 1939 1942 1974 1992 2011
B 1882 1907 1929 2007
United Kingdom N 1871 1875 1877 1883 1896 1899 1902 1907 1918 1925 1929 1938
1943 1951 1957 1979
B 1873 1889 1973 1990 2007
Italy N 1870 1883 1897 1918 1923 1925 1932 1939 1974 1992 2002 2011
B 1874 1887 1891 1929 2007
Japan N 1875 1877 1880 1887 1890 1892 1895 1898 1903 1913 1921 1929
1933 1940 1973 2001 2007
B 1882 1901 1907 1919 1925 1997
Netherlands N 1870 1873 1877 1889 1894 1899 1902 1913 1929 1957 1974 1980
2001 2011
B 1892 1906 1937 1939 2008
Norway N 1876 1881 1885 1893 1902 1916 1923 1939 1941 1957 1981 2007
2012
B 1899 1920 1930 1987
Portugal N 1870 1873 1877 1893 1900 1904 1907 1912 1914 1916 1927 1934
1937 1939 1941 1944 1947 1951 1973 1982 1992 2002
B 1888 1890 1923 1925 1929 2008 2010
Sweden N 1873 1876 1881 1883 1885 1888 1890 1899 1901 1904 1913 1916
1924 1939 1976 1980 2011
B 1879 1907 1920 1930 1990 2007
United States N 1875 1887 1889 1895 1901 1913 1916 1918 1926 1937 1944 1948
1953 1957 1969 1973 1979 1981 1990 2000
B 1873 1882 1892 1906 1909 1929 2007
Notes: "N" denotes a normal business cycle peak; "B" denotes a business cycle peak associated with a systemic baking crisis; I use crisis dates from




Emerging Economy Recession Chronology
Argentina N 1974 1977 1984 1987 1998 2008 2011 2013 2015 2017
B 1979 1994
Austria N 1974 1977 1980 1983 1992 2012
B 2008
Burundi N 1971 1973 1978 1981 1983 1988 1991 1998 2002 2004 2014 2017
B
Benin N 1970 1974 1977 1982 1985 1991 1993 2004 2008
B 1988
Burkina Faso N 1970 1972 1975 1978 1981 1986 1988 1993 1999 2008
B 1991
Bolivia N 1977 1991 1998 2000
B
Brazil N 1980 1987 1997 2000 2002 2008 2013
B 1989
Central African N 1970 1973 1986 1989 1999 2012
Republic B 1977 1995
Chile N 1971 1998 2008 2016
B 1981
Cote d'Ivoire N 1971 1973 1978 1985 1998 2010
B 1989
Cameroon N 1975 1984 2004 2008
B
Dem. Rep. of N 1971 1974 1986 2008 2015
Congo B 1984




Costa Rica N 1974 1979 1984 1990 2008
B 1995
Algeria N 1970 1979 1985 1996 2008 2016
B 1989
Egypt N 1972 1985 2010
B
Ethiopia N 1972 1981 1983 1988 1990 1993 1996 2001
B
Fiji N 1975 1979 1981 1984 1986 1990 1996 1999 2006
B
Gabon N 1976 1981 1984 1991 1998 2003 2007 2015
B
Ghana N 1971 1974 1978 2014
B
Greece N 1973 1979 1986 1989 1991 2014
B 2008
Grenada N 1979 1982 1991 2000 2003 2005 2008 2011
B
Guatemala N 1974 1980 2000 2008
B
Honduras N 1973 1979 1985 1989 1993 1998 2008
B
Haiti N 1971 1974 976 1980 1988 1999 2007 2009 2014 2016
B
India N 1970 1973 1975 1978 1990
B
Ireland N 1975 1982 1985 2010
B 2007
Iran N 1974 1976 1983 1992 2007 2011 2014 2017
B
Iceland N 1974 1982 1987 1990 1994 2001
B 2008
Jamaica N 1972 1981 1983 1993 1999 2001 2007 2011
B 1995
Jordan N 1970 1972 1982 1984 1986 1992 1995 2008
B
Kenya N 1974 1978 1980 1990 1996 1998 2001 2007
B




Sri Lanka N 1970 2000
B
Lesotho N 1970 1974 1978 1982 1985 1997 2016
B
Luxembourg N 1974 1980 1995 2011 2016
B 2007
Morocco N 1977 1982 1986 1991 1994 1996 1998
B 1980
Madagascar N 1971 1979 1990 2001 2008 2011
B
Mexico N 1985 2000 2007
B 1981 1994
Mali N 1972 1977 1979 1982 1991 2003
B 1986
Mauritania N 1970 1976 1979 1981 1986 1989 1991 1994 1996 1999 2006 2015
2017
B
Malawi N 1972 1980 1985 1991 1993 1997 2011 2015
B
Malaysia N 1974 1984 2000 2008
B 1997
Niger N 1971 1974 1979 1985 1988 1996 1998 2002 2006 2008 2010
B
Nigeria N 1974 1977 1985 1988 1998 2014
B 1990 1992
Nepal N 1970 1972 1974 1979 1982 1986 2001 2015
B
New Zealand N 1974 1976 1986 1988 2007 2009
B
Pakistan N 1970 1992 1996 2000 2007 2009
B
Panama N 1973 1982 1994 2000 2008
B 1987
Phillippines N 1990 2008
B 1982 1997
Paraguay N 1981 1985 1990 1997 2008 2011
B 1995
Rwanda N 1970 1973 1981 1983 1985 1989 1992
B
Senegal N 1970 1972 1976 1979 1982 1990 1999 2001 2005 2008 2010
B 1988
Sierra Leone N 1970 1974 1981 1984 1987 1994 2014
B 1990
El Salvador N 1978 1985 2008
B 1988
Chad N 1970 1975 1988 1994 1998 2005 2007 2012 2015
B 1991




Trinidad & N 1970 1982 1991 2008 2010 2013 2015
Tobago B
Tunisia N 1972 1981 1985 1987 2010
B
Turkey N 1977 1988 1990 1993 1998 2007
B 2000
Tanzania N 1972 1976 1979 1985 1993
B
Uruguay N 1970 1987 1994 1998
B 1981
Venezuela N 1977 1988 1992 1997 2001 2008 2012
B 1995
South Africa N 1971 1974 1981 1984 1989 1997 2008 2014
B
Zambia N 1970 1972 1980 1993 1997 2014
B
Zimbabwe N 1972 1981 1985 1991 1997 2015
B 1994
Notes: "N" denotes a normal business cycle peak; "B" denotes a business cycle peak associated with a systemic baking crisis; I use crisis dates from
Laeven & Valencia (2018) to classify peaks in real GDP per capita identified with the Bry and Boschan (1971) algorithm as either normal or banking.
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Debt Glossary 
Below are the definitions of crucial debt terms employed throughout the thesis. 
External Debt: total liabilities of a country with foreign creditors, both official (public) and private. 
Creditors often determine all the terms of the debt contracts, which are normally subject to the jurisdiction 
of the foreign creditors. 
Domestic Debt: liabilities of the public and private sector under domestic law. These comprise 
government domestic debt and private domestic credit, which for most countries are dominated by debts of 
households and firms contracted through domestic banking institutions. 
Gross Government Debt: total debt liabilities of a government with both domestic and foreign creditors. 
The “government” normally comprises the central administration (or central/federal government), 
provincial government (or state government), and all other entities that borrow with an explicit government 
guarantee, including town and municipality governments. 
Gross Private Credit: all outstanding debt liabilities to domestic banks of domestic households and 
nonfinancial corporations denominated in domestic currency – read: total domestic loans by domestic banks 
to the non-financial private sector. Banks are defined broadly as monetary financial institutions. 
Total Government Domestic Debt: all debt liabilities of a government that are issued under – and subject 
to – national jurisdiction, regardless of the nationality of the creditor or the currency denomination of the 
debt. Terms of the debt contracts can be market-determined of set unilaterally by the government. 
 
Supplementary Regression Tables and Figures 
 
TABLE A.5
Advanced Economy: GDP Recession Paths with Controls + Fixed Effects, Normal versus Banking Bins, Replication of Prior Study
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Log real GDP per capita (relative to year 0, ×100) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Normal Recession -3.57*** 0.28   0.98   0.75   0.56   
(0.82)  (1.39) (1.74) (2.69) (3.00) 
Banking-Crisis Recession -4.98*** -4.32** -4.32** -4.45   -4.58   
(1.10)  (1.91) (2.10) (3.26) (3.38) 
R 2 0.59 0.32 0.35 0.31 0.38
F -test equality of coefficients, Normal = Banking (p ) 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations, Normal 125 125 125 125 125
Observations, Banking-Crisis 45 45 45 45 45
Observations 170 170 170 170 170
Notes: Dependent variable: Δh yit(r)+h  = (change in log real GDP per capita from year 0 to year h ) × 100. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Country
fixed effects in all models, not reported. Other control variables, not reported, include d.lcpi, l.d.lcpi, d.lri_pc, l.d.lri_pc, d.rprv, l.d.rprv, LTIR, l.LTIR,
STIR, l.STIR, ca_gdp, and l.ca_gdp.





Advanced Economy: GDP Recession Paths, Normal versus Banking Bins by Across Country Public Debt Terciles
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Panel A: Log real GDP per capita (relative to year 0, ×100) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Low Debt × Normal Recession -1.69*** 0.90** 3.73*** 5.60*** 7.40***
(0.25)  (0.44) (0.56) (0.69) (0.85) 
Medium Debt × Normal Recession -2.33*** -0.46   1.00   2.61*** 4.02***
(0.27)  (0.40) (0.62) (0.88) (1.06) 
High Debt × Normal Recession -2.13*** -0.72   1.18*   2.19** 2.98***
(0.27)  (0.54) (0.67) (0.99) (1.14) 
Low Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -3.29*** -3.35*** -2.72   -1.72   1.24   
(0.68)  (1.00) (1.73) (2.12) (1.78) 
Medium Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -2.52*** -2.47** -2.03*   -0.14   0.80   
(0.63)  (1.12) (1.08) (1.55) (1.42) 
High Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -2.22*** -2.65*** -2.54** -0.42   -0.69   
(0.38)  (0.77) (1.11) (1.39) (1.44) 
R 2 0.47 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.23
F -test equality of coefficients, Low interaction terms (p ) 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F -test equality of coefficients, Medium interaction terms (p ) 0.79 0.09 0.02 0.13 0.07
F -test equality of coefficients, High interaction terms (p ) 0.83 0.04 0.00 0.13 0.05
Normal Recessions:
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × N = Medium × N (p ) 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × N = High × N (p ) 0.23 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00
Banking-Crisis Recessions:
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × BC = Medium × BC (p ) 0.41 0.56 0.74 0.55 0.85
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × BC = High × BC (p ) 0.17 0.58 0.93 0.61 0.40
Observations, Normal 202 202 202 202 202
Observations, Banking-Crisis 78 78 78 78 78
Observations 280 280 280 280 280
Notes: Dependent variable: Δh yit(r)+h  = (change in log real GDP per capita from year 0 to year h ) × 100. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Significance Levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
TABLE A.7
Advanced Economy: GDP Recession Paths, Normal versus Banking Bins with Continuous Measurement of Public Debt
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Panel A: Log real GDP per capita (relative to year 0, ×100) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Normal Recession -2.06*** -0.10   1.95*** 3.46*** 4.78***
(0.15) (0.28) (0.37) (0.52) (0.61) 
Banking-Crisis Recession -2.71*** -2.82*** -2.57*** -0.77   0.23   
(0.34) (0.59) (0.78) (0.99) (0.90) 
Normal Recession × Demeaned Public Debt (N × (! – !mean)) -0.12   -0.53   -0.66   -0.43   -1.20   
(0.50) (1.31) (1.44) (1.87) (1.89) 
Banking-Crisis Recession × Demeaned Public Debt (B × (! – !mean)) -0.34   -0.02   -2.58   -0.24   -4.45   
(1.05) (2.19) (3.16) (3.65) (3.41) 
R 2 0.46 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.20
F -test equality of coefficients, Normal = Banking (p ) 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F -test equality of coefficients, interaction terms (p ) 0.85 0.84 0.58 0.96 0.41
Observations, Normal 202 202 202 202 202
Observations, Banking-Crisis 78 78 78 78 78
Observations 280 280 280 280 280
Notes: Dependent variable: Δh yit(r)+h  = (change in log real GDP per capita from year 0 to year h ) × 100. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.




Advanced Economy: GDP Recession Paths, Normal versus Banking Bins by Within Country Public Debt Terciles, Fixed Effects
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Panel A: Log real GDP per capita (relative to year 0, ×100) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Normal Recession -3.50*** -0.19   -0.16   1.04   1.42   
(0.78)  (1.11) (1.47) (2.25) (2.52) 
Banking-Crisis Recession -4.35*** -2.91** -4.54*** -3.19   -3.25   
(0.95)  (1.45)  (1.73)  (2.59) (2.72) 
R 2 0.50 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.24
F -test equality of coefficients, Normal = Banking (p ) 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations, Normal 213 213 213 213 213
Observations, Banking-Crisis 84 84 84 84 84
Observations 297 297 297 297 297
Panel B: Log real GDP per capita (relative to year 0, ×100) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Low Debt × Normal Recession -3.40*** 0.38   0.92   2.45   2.93   
(0.82)  (1.08) (1.43) (2.15) (2.37) 
Medium Debt × Normal Recession -3.67*** -0.64   -1.04   -0.19   0.17   
(0.82)  (1.17) (1.66) (2.54) (2.83) 
High Debt × Normal Recession -3.46*** -0.41   -0.56   0.54   0.72   
(0.85)  (1.24) (1.55) (2.45) (2.80) 
Low Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -4.82*** -3.54** -5.08** -4.41   -3.26   
(1.01)  (1.37) (2.03) (2.85) (2.97) 
Medium Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -4.18*** -3.97*   -5.50** -4.38   -4.14   
(1.31)  (2.14) (2.25) (3.46) (3.38) 
High Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -4.09*** -1.93   -4.32** -2.21   -3.47   
(0.96)  (1.45) (1.86) (2.66) (2.81) 
R 2 0.53 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.26
F -test equality of coefficients, Low interaction terms (p ) 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F -test equality of coefficients, Medium interaction terms (p ) 0.49 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.06
F -test equality of coefficients, High interaction terms (p ) 0.22 0.16 0.00 0.11 0.01
Normal Recessions:
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × N = Medium × N (p ) 0.46 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.08
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × N = High × N (p ) 0.89 0.26 0.09 0.11 0.12
Banking-Crisis Recessions:
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × BC = Medium × BC (p ) 0.48 0.78 0.83 0.99 0.72
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × BC = High × BC (p ) 0.36 0.19 0.69 0.35 0.92
Observations, Normal 202 202 202 202 202
Observations, Banking-Crisis 78 78 78 78 78
Observations 280 280 280 280 280
Notes: Dependent variable: Δh yit(r)+h  = (change in log real GDP per capita from year 0 to year h ) × 100. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.




Advanced Economy: GDP Recession Paths, Normal versus Banking Bins by Across Country Public Debt Terciles, Fixed Effects
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Panel A: Log real GDP per capita (relative to year 0, ×100) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Low Debt × Normal Recession -3.11*** 0.58   1.17   2.62   3.09   
(0.81)  (1.10) (1.41) (2.13) (2.33) 
Medium Debt × Normal Recession -3.79*** -0.73   -1.18   -0.10   0.18   
(0.82)  (1.21) (1.62) (2.46) (2.70) 
High Debt × Normal Recession -3.83*** -1.22   -1.38   -0.89   -1.32   
(0.93)  (1.40) (1.71) (2.77) (3.17) 
Low Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -5.14*** -3.88*** -5.64** -5.18*   -3.65   
(1.06)  (1.46) (2.18) (3.05) (3.08) 
Medium Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -4.26*** -2.95  -4.76** -3.20   -3.65   
(1.23)  (2.04) (2.06) (3.16) (3.04) 
High Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -3.92*** -3.36** -5.12*** -3.83   -5.34*   
(0.98)  (1.58) (1.97) (2.98) (3.18) 
R 2 0.53 0.18 0.20 0.19 0.27
F -test equality of coefficients, Low interaction terms (p ) 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F -test equality of coefficients, Medium interaction terms (p ) 0.50 0.09 0.01 0.10 0.03
F -test equality of coefficients, High interaction terms (p ) 0.86 0.03 0.00 0.11 0.04
Normal Recessions:
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × N = Medium × N (p ) 0.10 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.05
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × N = High × N (p ) 0.14 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02
Banking-Crisis Recessions:
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × BC = Medium × BC (p ) 0.35 0.54 0.66 0.46 1.00
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × BC = High × BC (p ) 0.14 0.71 0.81 0.63 0.52
Observations, Normal 202 202 202 202 202
Observations, Banking-Crisis 78 78 78 78 78
Observations 280 280 280 280 280
Notes: Dependent variable: Δh yit(r)+h  = (change in log real GDP per capita from year 0 to year h ) × 100. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Country fixed
effects in all models, not reported.




Advanced Economy: Investment Recession Paths, Normal versus Banking Bins by Within Country Public Debt Terciles, Fixed Effects
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Panel A: Log real investment per capita (relative to year 0, ×100) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Normal Recession -6.86**  -1.56   -0.91  -2.21  -1.98  
(3.01)  (3.73) (4.37) (5.78) (6.16) 
Banking-Crisis Recession -11.69*** -13.94*** -18.35*** -19.00** -19.86***
(3.75)  (5.36)  (6.33)  (7.66)  (7.34)  
R 2 0.18 0.19 0.15 0.12 0.10
F -test equality of coefficients, Normal = Banking (p ) 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations, Normal 198 198 198 198 198
Observations, Banking-Crisis 71 71 71 71 71
Observations 269 269 269 269 269
Panel B: Log real investment per capita (relative to year 0, ×100) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Low Debt × Normal Recession -7.50**  -1.05   0.86   -0.64   0.18   
(3.08)  (3.84) (4.41) (5.67) (6.06) 
Medium Debt × Normal Recession -6.65*    -2.47   -3.49   -5.65   -6.90   
(3.43)  (4.00) (5.05) (6.79) (7.28) 
High Debt × Normal Recession -5.43   0.03   1.10   1.27   2.22   
(3.39)  (4.10) (5.02) (6.41) (7.00) 
Low Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -17.02*** -23.58*** -31.23*** -31.13*** -26.44***
(3.97)  (5.55)  (10.62)  (10.92) (9.76)  
Medium Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -12.24** -17.31** -20.90*** -24.33** -26.82***
(5.64)  (7.66)  (7.94)  (9.91)  (9.26)  
High Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -9.07**  -7.40   -11.70*    -10.90  -14.97** 
(3.69)  (4.95) (6.25)  (7.64) (7.51)  
R 2 0.22 0.27 0.21 0.17 0.15
F -test equality of coefficients, Low interaction terms (p ) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F -test equality of coefficients, Medium interaction terms (p ) 0.20 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
F -test equality of coefficients, High interaction terms (p ) 0.15 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.00
Normal Recessions:
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × N = Medium × N (p ) 0.71 0.64 0.22 0.31 0.22
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × N = High × N (p ) 0.26 0.72 0.95 0.68 0.69
Banking-Crisis Recessions:
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × BC = Medium × BC (p ) 0.32 0.35 0.36 0.56 0.97
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × BC = High × BC (p ) 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.21
Observations, Normal 187 187 187 187 187
Observations, Banking-Crisis 65 65 65 65 65
Observations 252 252 252 252 252
Notes: Dependent variable: Δh yit(r)+h  = (change in log real GDP per capita from year 0 to year h ) × 100. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.




Advanced Economy: Gov. Exp. Recession Paths, Normal versus Banking Bins by Within Country Public Debt Terciles, Fixed Effects
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Panel A: Percent Δ in Government Expenditures (relative to year 0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Normal Recession 11.30*** 21.58*** 33.69*** 46.08*** 59.04***
(3.64)  (7.44) (9.64) (11.63) (13.86) 
Banking-Crisis Recession 10.09** 17.77** 25.75** 32.71*** 42.63***
(3.99)  (7.75)  (9.95) (12.11) (14.51) 
R 2 0.20 0.27 0.33 0.36 0.35
F -test equality of coefficients, Normal = Banking (p ) 0.54 0.18 0.02 0.00 0.00
Observations, Normal 200 200 200 200 200
Observations, Banking-Crisis 80 80 80 80 80
Observations 280 280 280 280 280
Panel B: Percent Δ in Government Expenditures (relative to year 0) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Low Debt × Normal Recession 14.18*** 28.55*** 43.39*** 61.85*** 78.87***
(3.60)  (7.18)  (9.27) (10.90) (13.00) 
Medium Debt × Normal Recession 8.75*** 17.55*** 28.70*** 36.71*** 46.57***
(3.28)  (6.50)  (8.51) (9.85) (11.86) 
High Debt × Normal Recession 8.26**  14.67** 23.10*** 30.90*** 38.87***
(3.32)  (6.44) (8.61) (10.30) (12.72) 
Low Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession 12.27*** 15.84** 23.04** 28.09*** 41.02***
(4.24)  (7.37) (9.26) (10.72) (12.86) 
Medium Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession 8.06**  15.87** 24.65** 30.53** 37.22** 
(3.75)  (7.65) (10.24) (12.05) (14.75) 
High Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession 6.25    15.38** 21.13** 25.61** 30.00** 
(4.07)  (7.16) (9.66) (11.46) (14.04) 
R 2 0.24 0.32 0.38 0.42 0.42
F -test equality of coefficients, Low interaction terms (p ) 0.62 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
F -test equality of coefficients, Medium interaction terms (p ) 0.74 0.69 0.50 0.39 0.30
F -test equality of coefficients, High interaction terms (p ) 0.47 0.84 0.68 0.40 0.25
Normal Recessions:
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × N = Medium × N (p ) 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × N = High × N (p ) 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Banking-Crisis Recessions:
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × BC = Medium × BC (p ) 0.24 1.00 0.83 0.79 0.73
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × BC = High × BC (p ) 0.14 0.93 0.78 0.76 0.27
Observations, Normal 191 191 191 191 191
Observations, Banking-Crisis 75 75 75 75 75
Observations 266 266 266 266 266
Notes: Dependent variable: Δh yit(r)+h  = (change in log real GDP per capita from year 0 to year h ) × 100. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.





Emerging Economy: GDP Recession Paths, Normal versus Banking Bins by Across Country Public Debt Terciles
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Panel A: Log real GDP per capita (relative to year 0, ×100) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Low Debt × Normal Recession -3.06*** -2.34*** -1.51*   -1.23  -0.93  
(0.27)  (0.55) (0.80) (1.11) (1.35) 
Medium Debt × Normal Recession -3.74*** -3.48*** -2.54*** -1.88*   -0.81  
(0.44)  (0.65) (0.78) (0.96) (1.26) 
High Debt × Normal Recession -2.96*** -3.44*** -2.73*** -1.48   -0.61  
(0.28)  (0.71) (0.80) (0.99) (1.21) 
Low Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -4.61*** -7.50*** -6.33*** -5.40** -4.43   
(1.17)  (1.83) (2.27) (2.52) (2.90) 
Medium Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -3.84*** -2.00*   -1.58   -1.23   0.05   
(0.70)  (1.20) (1.84) (2.02) (2.18) 
High Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -5.16*** -7.23*** -8.05*** -7.84*** -7.71** 
(1.05)  (1.55) (1.80) (2.41) (3.52) 
R 2 0.44 0.19 0.09 0.04 0.01
F -test equality of coefficients, Low interactions terms (p ) 0.20 0.01 0.05 0.13 0.27
F -test equality of coefficients, Medium interaction terms (p ) 0.90 0.28 0.63 0.77 0.73
F -test equality of coefficients, High interaction terms (p ) 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.06
Observations, Normal 401 401 401 401 401
Observations, Banking-Crisis 41 41 41 41 41
Observations 442 442 442 442 442
Notes: Dependent variable: Δh yit(r)+h  = (change in log real GDP per capita from year 0 to year h ) × 100. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Significance Levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
TABLE A.13
Emerging Economy: GDP Recession Paths, Normal versus Banking Bins with Continuous Measurement of Public Debt
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Panel A: Log real GDP per capita (relative to year 0, ×100) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Normal Recession -3.22*** -3.12*** -2.31*** -1.53** -0.77   
(0.19) (0.39) (0.48) (0.61) (0.75) 
Banking-Crisis Recession -4.48*** -5.56*** -5.28*** -4.76*** -3.88**
(0.59) (0.98) (1.25) (1.41) (1.68) 
Normal Recession × Demeaned Public Debt (N × (! – !mean)) 0.47   -0.95   -1.17   0.00   0.24   
(0.58) (1.38) (1.96) (2.32) (2.80) 
Banking-Crisis Recession × Demeaned Public Debt (B × (! – !mean)) -1.49   0.77   0.77   0.30   -1.94   
(2.44) (4.47) (5.33) (5.86) (7.75) 
R 2 0.44 0.18 0.08 0.03 0.01
F -test equality of coefficients, Normal = Banking (p ) 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.09
F -test equality of coefficients, Interactions terms (p ) 0.44 0.71 0.73 0.96 0.79
Observations, Normal 401 401 401 401 401
Observations, Banking-Crisis 41 41 41 41 41
Observations 442 442 442 442 442
Notes: Dependent variable: Δh yit(r)+h  = (change in log real GDP per capita from year 0 to year h ) × 100. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.




Emerging Economy: GDP Recession Paths, Normal versus Banking Bins by Within Country Public Debt Terciles, Fixed Effects
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Panel A: Log real GDP per capita (relative to year 0, ×100) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Normal Recession -3.72*** -2.70*  -2.78   -3.94   -3.91   
(0.95)  (1.47) (2.58) (3.17) (2.98) 
Banking-Crisis Recession -5.52*** -6.06*** -7.21** -9.14** -10.18***
(1.16)  (1.74)  (2.95)  (3.63) (3.45) 
R 2 0.57 0.35 0.31 0.29 0.31
F -test equality of coefficients, Normal = Banking (p ) 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations, Normal 401 401 401 401 401
Observations, Banking-Crisis 41 41 41 41 41
Observations 442 442 442 442 442
Panel B: Log real GDP per capita (relative to year 0, ×100) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Low Debt × Normal Recession -3.84*** -1.69   -1.57   -2.91   -2.47   
(1.08)  (1.76) (2.80) (3.41) (3.27) 
Medium Debt × Normal Recession -3.44*** -1.68   -1.94   -3.49   -3.86   
(1.03)  (1.70) (2.75) (3.46) (3.24) 
High Debt × Normal Recession -3.70*** -2.59   -2.24   -2.64   -2.05   
(1.05)  (1.91) (2.93) (3.44) (3.31) 
Low Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -5.99*** -9.22*** -10.63*** -12.37** -13.60***
(1.77)  (2.55) (3.91) (4.81) (4.49) 
Medium Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -3.95*** -3.15   -3.99   -5.41   -7.40*   
(1.25)  (2.09) (3.25) (4.01) (4.43) 
High Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -5.82*** -3.62   -4.44   -6.77   -6.85   
(1.36)  (2.41) (3.52) (4.35) (4.47) 
R 2 0.58 0.36 0.32 0.30 0.32
F -test equality of coefficients, Low interaction terms (p ) 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F -test equality of coefficients, Medium interaction terms (p ) 0.52 0.29 0.28 0.44 0.31
F -test equality of coefficients, High interaction terms (p ) 0.03 0.59 0.36 0.17 0.16
Normal Recessions:
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × N = Medium × N (p ) 0.41 0.99 0.73 0.69 0.45
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × N = High × N (p ) 0.75 0.38 0.57 0.84 0.80
Banking-Crisis Recessions:
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × BC = Medium × BC (p ) 0.26 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.17
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × BC = High × BC (p ) 0.93 0.03 0.06 0.16 0.13
Observations, Normal 401 401 401 401 401
Observations, Banking-Crisis 41 41 41 41 41
Observations 442 442 442 442 442
Notes: Dependent variable: Δh yit(r)+h  = (change in log real GDP per capita from year 0 to year h ) × 100. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.




Emerging Economy: GDP Recession Paths, Normal versus Banking Bins by Across Country Public Debt Terciles, Fixed Effects
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Panel A; Log real GDP per capita (relative to year 0, ×100) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Low Debt × Normal Recession -3.29*** -1.37   -1.74   -2.93   -2.53   
(0.97)  (1.50) (2.37) (2.94) (2.90) 
Medium Debt × Normal Recession -4.29*** -3.46** -3.67   -5.14*   -5.15*   
(0.99)  (1.43) (2.33) (3.01) (2.82) 
High Debt × Normal Recession -3.31*** -2.92*   -2.73   -3.37   -3.45   
(0.99)  (1.71) (2.58) (3.05) (2.99) 
Low Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -5.45*** -8.46*** -9.70*** -11.92*** -14.27***
(2.03)  (2.39) (2.97) (3.46) (3.78) 
Medium Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -4.96*** -2.84  -3.34   -4.73   -4.85   
(1.12)  (1.98) (3.14) (3.95) (3.59) 
High Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -5.86*** -6.91*** -8.90*** -11.07** -11.73**
(1.51)  (2.33) (3.33) (4.35) (4.65) 
R 2 0.58 0.37 0.32 0.30 0.32
F -test equality of coefficients, Low interactions terms (p ) 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F -test equality of coefficients, Medium interaction terms (p ) 0.46 0.73 0.88 0.87 0.91
F -test equality of coefficients, High interaction terms (p ) 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.04
Observations, Normal 401 401 401 401 401
Observations, Banking-Crisis 41 41 41 41 41
Observations 442 442 442 442 442
Notes: Dependent variable: Δh yit(r)+h  = (change in log real GDP per capita from year 0 to year h ) × 100. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Country fixed
effects in all models, not reported.




Emerging Economy: Investment Recession Paths, Normal versus Banking Bins by Within Country Public Debt Terciles, Fixed Effects
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Panel A: Log real investment per capita (relative to year 0, ×100) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Normal Recession -8.86**  -7.58*   -8.70  -17.37*   -18.37** 
(4.25)  (4.20) (8.64) (9.56) (8.18) 
Banking-Crisis Recession -16.95*** -18.92*** -21.58** -24.73** -25.67** 
(5.80)  (6.86)  (9.96)  (11.65) (10.38) 
R 2 0.30 0.24 0.20 0.15 0.15
F -test equality of coefficients, Normal = Banking (p ) 0.08 0.10 0.04 0.36 0.37
Observations, Normal 400 400 400 400 400
Observations, Banking-Crisis 41 41 41 41 41
Observations 441 441 441 441 441
Panel B: Log real investment per capita (relative to year 0, ×100) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Low Debt × Normal Recession -6.85   -1.05   -3.51   -10.60   -12.88   
(4.50) (5.69) (9.78) (10.99) (10.02) 
Medium Debt × Normal Recession -8.90**  -4.63   -3.78   -13.32   -13.96   
(4.19) (5.47) (9.53) (11.12) (9.53) 
High Debt × Normal Recession -12.08*** -7.52   -7.49   -13.36   -12.61   
(4.61) (5.98) (10.03) (11.15) (10.12) 
Low Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -15.68** -31.44*** -37.81*** -43.61*** -45.73***
(6.74) (8.78) (12.56) (14.82) (13.31) 
Medium Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -12.40* -12.39  -13.36  -27.88*   -26.33*   
(6.59) (9.14) (12.50) (16.48) (13.92) 
High Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession -19.85**  -5.62   -5.85   0.40   -0.86   
(9.40) (13.65) (13.75) (16.61) (16.16) 
R 2 0.30 0.26 0.21 0.17 0.16
F -test equality of coefficients, Low interaction terms (p ) 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F -test equality of coefficients, Medium interaction terms (p ) 0.53 0.33 0.28 0.27 0.28
F -test equality of coefficients, High interaction terms (p ) 0.38 0.89 0.88 0.32 0.41
Normal Recessions:
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × N = Medium × N (p ) 0.52 0.37 0.96 0.63 0.86
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × N = High × N (p ) 0.09 0.11 0.40 0.64 0.97
Banking-Crisis Recessions:
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × BC = Medium × BC (p ) 0.68 0.07 0.04 0.32 0.18
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × BC = High × BC (p ) 0.69 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.01
Observations, Normal 400 400 400 400 400
Observations, Banking-Crisis 41 41 41 41 41
Observations 441 441 441 441 441
Notes: Dependent variable: Δh yit(r)+h  = (change in log real GDP per capita from year 0 to year h ) × 100. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.













Emerigng Economy: Gov. Exp. Recession Paths, Normal versus Banking Bins by Within Country Public Debt Terciles, Fixed Effects
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Panel A: Percent Δ in Government Expenditures (relative to year 0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Normal Recession 5.79*   17.96*   14.90  11.98  18.15  
(3.48)  (9.16) (12.20) (12.87) (13.33) 
Banking-Crisis Recession 4.71   17.76   11.89   8.49   11.88   
(4.15)  (10.94)  (13.10) (13.55) (13.69) 
R 2 0.17 0.21 0.22 0.26 0.30
F -test equality of coefficients, Normal = Banking (p ) 0.65 0.96 0.48 0.50 0.28
Observations, Normal 401 401 401 401 401
Observations, Banking-Crisis 41 41 41 41 41
Observations 442 442 442 442 442
Panel B: Percent Δ in Government Expenditures (relative to year 0) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Low Debt × Normal Recession 7.38**  22.22** 21.53*   19.00  27.74*   
(3.48)  (8.67)  (12.15) (13.04) (14.24) 
Medium Debt × Normal Recession 4.09   13.76   10.01   6.58  10.10  
(3.39)  (8.48)  (11.84) (12.78) (13.92) 
High Debt × Normal Recession 2.75   13.09   8.64  3.44  8.57  
(3.63)  (8.79) (12.86) (13.87) (15.00) 
Low Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession 9.55** 26.77** 21.28   20.77   27.98** 
(4.52)  (13.18) (14.21) (13.58) (13.55) 
Medium Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession 4.58    16.77*   15.54   13.02   16.86   
(4.32)  (9.64) (13.42) (16.11) (17.12) 
High Debt × Banking-Crisis Recession 0.15    10.53   3.16   -3.80   -3.25   
(5.17)  (9.89) (13.40) (15.16) (16.50) 
R 2 0.20 0.25 0.27 0.31 0.35
F -test equality of coefficients, Low interaction terms (p ) 0.52 0.54 0.97 0.80 0.98
F -test equality of coefficients, Medium interaction terms (p ) 0.87 0.55 0.39 0.52 0.51
F -test equality of coefficients, High interaction terms (p ) 0.51 0.63 0.39 0.39 0.20
Normal Recessions:
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × N = Medium × N (p ) 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × N = High × N (p ) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Banking-Crisis Recessions:
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × BC = Medium × BC (p ) 0.24 0.24 0.54 0.51 0.36
F -test equality of coefficients, Low × BC = High × BC (p ) 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.01
Observations, Normal 401 401 401 401 401
Observations, Banking-Crisis 41 41 41 41 41
Observations 442 442 442 442 442
Notes: Dependent variable: Δh yit(r)+h  = (change in log real GDP per capita from year 0 to year h ) × 100. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Significance Levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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